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Abstract
We study the random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The key difference
between the setting with bundles and the setting with objects (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001)) is one of feasibility. The implications of this difference are significant. First, the
characterization of sd-efficient random assignments is fundamentally different. Second, a
possibility result in the setting with objects fails in the setting with bundles. However, in
the setting with bundles, we are able to identify a preference restriction, called essential
monotonicity, under which the random serial dictatorship rule (extended to the setting with
bundles) is equivalent to the probabilistic serial rule (extended to the setting with bundles).
This equivalence implies the existence of a rule on this restricted domain satisfying sd-
efficiency, sd-strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals. Moreover, this rule selects
only random assignments which can be decomposed as convex combinations of determin-
istic assignments.
Keywords: Random assignments; bundles; decomposability; sd-efficiency; sd-strategy-
proofness; equal treatment of equals
JEL Classification: C78, D47, D71.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of allocating a finite set of objects to a finite set of agents, where
money transfers are prohibited and each agent gets a bundle of objects. Each object has a
certain number of identical copies. We refer to this number as the capacity of the object and
require that it be smaller than the number of agents. A bundle is a subset of these objects. In
particular, a bundle can take at most one copy of each object. In order to restore fairness, we
adopt randomization in allocations.
A central assumption in earlier studies is that each agent gets at most one object (see for
example Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)). However,
∗This study was supported by the Ministry of Education, Singapore under the grant MOE2016-T2-1-168. We
would like to thank Huaxia Zeng and Jingyi Xue for constructive suggestions. For valuable discussions, we would
like to thank the participants of the SJET workshop, 2018.
†School of Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore.
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for many relevant applications, it is more appropriate to allocate the objects in bundles for at
least two reasons. First, complementarity may require allocation in bundles in order to improve
efficiency. Second, the total number of objects may be more than the number of agents and
free disposal may not be acceptable. An example displaying these attributes is presented in
Section 1.1.
In this setting, a random assignment rule is a function which takes as input preference pro-
files on bundles and selects a profile of lotteries on bundles, one for each agent. We investigate
the existence of a random assignment rule that satisfies several desirable axioms.
The first axiom we consider is decomposability, which addresses the issue of implementing
the selected random assignment. Put otherwise, the random assignment needs to be decomposed
as a lottery over deterministically feasible assignments. Unfortunately, due to the combinatorial
feature of the problem, a random assignment is in general not guaranteed to be decomposable.
The second axiom deals with fairness and requires that whenever two agents report the same
preference, they get the same lottery. To define the remaining axioms, we adopt the stochastic
dominance extension, which states that a lottery is weakly better than another lottery if the
former first-order stochastically dominates the latter.1 The third axiom, sd-efficiency, requires
that the rule selects only random assignments that are not Pareto dominated. The last axiom, sd-
strategy-proofness, deals with incentive compatibility and requires that no unilateral deviation
leads to a strictly better lottery.
Our first result (Theorem 1) characterizes sd-efficiency. More specifically, a random assign-
ment is sd-efficient at a given preference profile if and only if it is unbalanced, which translates
to the impossibility of identifying a Pareto improvement in a particular way. Moreover, we
extend the simultaneous eating algorithm studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) to the
current setting and show that all random assignments generated by them are sd-efficient. How-
ever, there exists an sd-efficient random assignment at some profile that can not be generated
by the simultaneous eating algorithm with any eating speed (see Remark 4).
We present subsequently an existence result. On a particular domain of preferences, the
domain of essentially monotonic preferences, we show that there exists a decomposable random
assignment rule satisfying sd-strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals.
The set of essentially monotonic preferences varies with the capacities of objects. We first
identify a subset of bundles as the critical bundles. Then essential monotonicity requires that a
bundle contained in a critical bundle is less preferred to this critical bundle. Critical bundles are
identified by letting agents sequentially take bundles and assuming that, whenever an agent is
called upon, she takes one copy of each object that is still available. For example, if each object
has 10 copies, each of the first 10 agent takes the whole bundle and the others take the empty
bundle. Hence the set of critical bundles in this case contains only the whole bundle and the
empty bundle. For another, if each of a and b has 10 copies and each of c and d has 5 copies,
then each of the first 5 agents takes the whole bundle abcd; each of the next 5 agents takes ab;
and all the others take the empty bundle. In this case, the set of critical bundles contains three
bundles: abcd, ab, and the empty bundle. Notice that the more the capacities vary, the greater
1Such an extension is equivalent to that the former lottery generates an expected utility that is weakly higher
than that delivered by the later, with respect to every Bernoulli utility representing the given ordinal preference.
2
the number of critical bundles that impose restrictions on preferences, and consequently the
smaller the domain of essentially monotonic preferences.
According to the way we identify the critical bundles, the notion of essential monotonicity
can be seen as modeling situations where all objects are “goods,” so that whenever an agent
is called upon to take some objects, she will take a copy of each available object. In addition,
essential monotonicity applies also to situations where all the objects are “bads”; one replaces
the copies of every object by the copies of “not taking this object.” Section 1.1 illustrates the
applicability of essentially monotonicity with specific examples of each case.
In order to show the existence of a desirable random assignment rule, we extend the Proba-
bilistic Serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) and the Random Serial Dictatorship rule
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)) to the setting with bundles. Proposition 2 and 3 study re-
spectively the performance of these two rules on the universal domain. In particular, the random
serial dictatorship rule for bundles, henceforth the RSDB rule, satisfies sd-strategy-proofness,
decomposability, and equal treatment of equals but violates sd-efficiency. On the contrary, the
probabilistic serial rule for the bundles, henceforth the PSB rule, satisfies sd-efficiency and
equal treatment of equals but violates sd-strategy-proofness and decomposability.2
Theorem 2 proves that these two rules are equivalent on the essentially monotonic domain,
which then implies the desired existence result, stated in Corollary 1. It is surprising that these
two rules become equivalent on such a large domain in the setting with bundles. This is in sharp
contrast to the disparity these two rules display in the setting with objects. Another feature of
our result is that both rules degenerate to a constant rule. Here too, the fact that sd-efficiency is
preserved by a simple constant assignment on such a large domain is rare in mechanism design
and comes as a surprise.
In addition to the existence result on the essentially monotonic domain, following the liter-
ature, we demonstrate an impossibility result on the universal domain.3 In particular, we show
that, if there are more than three critical bundles, there is no sd-strategy-proof, sd-efficient, and
sd-envy-free rule on the universal domain, where sd-envy-freeness is a fairness axiom stronger
than equal treatment of equals and requires that every agent weakly prefers her own lottery to
any other’s.
The final part of our analysis deals with the issue of decomposability. We provide a neces-
sary condition for decomposability, which is used to show that the random assignment gener-
ated by the PSB rule is in general not decomposable. Moreover, we transform the problem of
decomposing a given random assignment to a series of maximum flow problems. Since maxi-
mum flow problems are amenable to numerical analysis, this reduction might be helpful for the
decomposition of random assignments.
The remainder of this section contains two subsections. Section 1.1 presents a specific
example of the formulation and the applicability of essentially monotonic domains. Section 1.2
provides a brief literature review. Following the introduction, Section 2 defines formally the
model and axioms we study. Section 3 characterizes sd-efficient random assignments. Section 4
2Liu (2017) proved that the PS rule in the setting with objects is sd-strategy-proof on the sequentially dichoto-
mous domains. We will show that when the PS rule and the sequentially dichotomous domains are extended
naturally to the setting with bundles, this possibility fails.
3See Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), Kasajima (2013), Chang and Chun (2017), and Liu and Zeng (2017).
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consists of five subsections. Subsection 4.1 and 4.2 define and examine, respectively, the
RSDB rule and the PSB rule. Subsection 4.3 introduces the domain of essentially monotonic
preferences. Subsection 4.4 shows the equivalence between the two rules on the essentially
monotonic domain. Subsection 4.5 presents a general impossibility on the universal domain.
Section 5 studies the decomposability of random assignments and Section 6 concludes.
1.1 A Leading Example
We present in this subsection an example that illustrates the scope of our study.
Example 1. A local government has developed a public housing project, which provides 50
units of standardized apartments, 50 parking slots, and 30 bicycle slots. These objects need to
be fully allocated among 100 eligible applicants without any money transfers. 
The objects in the example above are publicly financed and consequently free disposal is
not an option as the objects ought not to be wasted. Hence a treatment that replicates the rules
used in the object assignment literature (see for example Pa´pai (2000a) and Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2001)) are not appropriate since a central assumption there is that each agent receives
at most one object, which implies for our problem that finally 30 objects need to be discarded.
Another way to allocate these objects is to do so via independent committees, one for each
type of the objects. However, given that the agents’ preferences may reflect complementarity
and substitution, the efficiency losses incurred by this method may be significant.
It is therefore of interest to investigate the allocation of objects in bundles. Moreover, due to
the indivisibility of the objects, agents reporting the same preference will potentially be treated
differently. In order to achieve fairness, we resort to random assignments. In particular, every
agent receives a lottery on bundles.
There are in total 8 distinct bundles. In order to simplify the notation, we denote an apart-
ment as a, a parking slot as p, and a bicycle slot as b. In addition, a bundle is denoted simply
as a sequence of these alphabets rather than its set format. For example, the whole bundle is
denoted as apb rather than {a, p, b}.
Since objects are given to the agents for free, it might be reasonable to assume that a bundle
containing more objects is better. This is captured by a classical preference restriction, mono-
tonicity, which requires that a bundle contained in another bundle is less preferred to this later
bundle. A typical monotonic preference is as follows.
Pi : apb  ap  ab  pb  a  p  b  ∅
Our preference restriction, essential monotonicity, weakens monotonicity in the sense that
it is required only for every critical bundle that if a bundle is contained in a critical bundle, it
is less preferred. We now proceed to identify the critical bundles for this example. We assume
that agents are lined up and required to take bundles one by one. Moreover, whenever an agent
is called upon, she takes one copy of each available object. As for the current case, each of the
first 30 agents will take the whole bundle apb, each of the next 20 agents will take ap, and each
of the remaining agents will take the empty bundle ∅. Hence, there are in total three critical
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bundles. Essential monotonicity imposes three preference restrictions: (i) a bundle contained in
apb is less preferred; (ii) a bundle contained in ap is less preferred; and (iii) a bundle contained
in ∅ is less preferred.4
Hence the domain of essentially monotonic preferences includes not only all monotonic
preferences, but also preferences like the one below, where the critical bundles are underlined.
P ′i : apb  ap  ab  a  ∅  b  p  pb
An agent having the above preference treats a bundle acceptable (better than getting nothing)
if and only if it contains an apartment. Moreover, she treats the bicycle slots and parking slots
as benefits if she gets an apartment. However, she treats these as bads otherwise.5 The classical
monotonicity requirement captures only complete complementarity: the more the better no
matter the status quo. As shown by Pi, getting additional objects is always preferred. However,
our notion of essential monotonicity captures also “partial complementarity.” As shown by P ′i ,
getting an apartment is always preferred. But whether getting a bicycle slot and a parking slot
is preferred depends on whether the agent already gets an apartment.
As mentioned earlier, the set of critical bundles varies according to capacities. When the
objects have the same capacity, there are only two critical bundles: the whole bundle and the
empty bundle. In this case, the only restriction imposed on essentially monotonic preferences
is that the whole bundle is the favorite. To the other extreme, when the objects have capacities
different from each other, there are m + 1 critical bundles, where m is the number of object
types. To summarize, the greater the variation in the capacities, the greater the number of
critical bundles and hence the greater the number of restrictions on the essentially monotonic
preferences.
Now consider the following alternative scenario, where we seek to allocate three types of
tasks, a, b, and c respectively, among a given set of agents. In particular, assume that 50 working
days of task a, 50 working days of task b, and 30 working days of task c have to be allocated
among 100 team members. In this situation, objects appear to be “bads” and it would appear that
the essential monotonicity requirement is not applicable to such situations as it would require,
in the very least, that the grand bundle is the favorite. But the following preference, which
seems to be reasonable in this situation, treats the empty set as the best.
P ′′ : ∅  a  b  c  ab  ac  bc  abc
However, the following observation makes essential monotonicity applicable. We need only
to treat the following as the objects to be allocated: 50 copies of “not serving a working day
of task a,” 50 copies of “not serving a working day of task b,” and 70 copies of “not serving
a working day of task c.” These imaginary objects are denoted as a¯, b¯, and c¯ respectively. For
4Notice that the last restriction is vacuous. However, we still present it as a restriction in order to simplify
definition.
5Put otherwise, receiving a parking slot or a bicycle slot without living nearby is costly. This is plausible for two
reasons. First, objects obtained from a publicly financed project are usually not allowed to be used to make profit.
So it would be very difficult to benefit from renting them out. Second, receiving a parking slot in a project may
probably exclude the agent from getting a parking slot in some future projects, which might assign an apartment
to her.
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this new problem, the critical bundles are a¯b¯c¯, c¯, and ∅. Then the preference P ′′ above can be
translated to P¯ ′′, which is essentially monotonic for the imaginary problem.
P ′′ : a¯b¯c¯  b¯c¯  a¯c¯  a¯b¯  c¯  b¯  a¯  ∅
Hence, once these imaginary objects are allocated, the tasks are allocated automatically. More-
over, essential monotonicity should be a reasonable preference restriction for these imaginary
objects.
Given a random assignment problem of bundles with essentially monotonic preferences, we
can simply identify the critical bundles and then equally allocate these bundles to the agents.
This method turns out to be equivalent to both the PS rule and the RSD rule, extended to the
bundle setting. The point will become clear as we proceed.
1.2 Related Work
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) were the first to introduce randomization to the allocations
of indivisible objects. Two decades later, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) proved the ran-
dom serial dictatorship rule as equivalent to the randomization over core allocations, which
explains the popularity of this rule in realistic applications. Then Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001) proposed to evaluate its efficiency ex ante rather than ex post and pointed out that the
RSD rule is sd-inefficient. Instead, they introduced the simultaneous eating algorithm to gen-
erate sd-efficient random assignments. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed also that the
RSD rule is sd-strategy-proof but not sd-efficient while the PS rule is sd-efficient but not sd-
strategy-proof. Pa´pai (2000b) and Pa´pai (2001) consider allocations in bundles rather than in
individual objects. Respectively, Pa´pai (2001) imposes no preference restriction while Pa´pai
(2000b) imposed monotonicity. However, these studies did not adopt randomization.
More closely related are the recent papers on random assignment of bundles, among which
Budish et al. (2013), Nguyen et al. (2016), Akbarpour and Nikzad (2017) focused on decompos-
ability of a random assignment. In particular, Budish et al. (2013) generalize the Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem to a larger class of probabilistic matrices. Akbarpour and Nikzad (2017)
further stated that if a subset of feasibility restrictions can be viewed as “soft,” the class of
decomposable probabilistic matrices can be further enlarged. Relatively, Nguyen et al. (2016)
studied the approximation of decomposition and stated that if agents can not take bundles con-
taining more than k objects, every random assignment can be decomposed approximately in the
sense that each object is over-allocated by at most k − 1 units, ex post. We will discuss these
papers in greater detail in Section 5.
Except for these three papers, there are others studying the designing of desirable random
assignment rules, including Budish (2011), So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010), and Budish and Cantil-
lon (2012). Our study differs from theirs mainly on the following three points. First, they all
assume free disposal, which is a reasonable assumption given that they were studying course
allocations in universities. Second, they focused on the so-called “pseudo-market” approach
which endows the agents with pseudo money and then the mechanism mimics the market equi-
librium. Our approach is different and the results are different since we identify a preference
restriction to prove the existence of a desirable rule with no free disposal in the model.
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2 Model and Axioms
Let I ≡ {1, · · · , n} denote a finite set of agents and let X denote a finite set of objects. Let
in addition m ≡ |X|. Assume n > 2 and m > 2. In order to incorporate situations where some
objects are physically identical, we allow an object to have multiple copies. For each x ∈ X ,
the capacity of x is a positive integer qx, which denotes the number of its copies. We assume
qx ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1} so that the number of copies is smaller than the number of agents.6 The
capacities are collected in a vector q = (qx)x∈X .
A bundle of objects is a subset of X . The set of bundles is hence the power set 2X and
denoted as X . Note that our definition of a bundle does not allow it to contain more than one
copy of each object. Throughout the paper we denote objects with lowercase English alphabets
and denote bundles with uppercase English alphabets, i.e., a, b, c, x, y, z ∈ X and A,B,C ∈ X .
In addition, we usually denote the bundle {a, b, c} simply as abc.
Each agent i ∈ I is assumed to have a strict preference Pi on bundles, i.e., a linear order
on X . Following the convention, we denote A Ri B if and only if either A = B or A Pi B.
The set of all strict preferences is denoted as P and referred to as the universal domain. Let
D ⊂ P be a nonempty subset of the universal domain. We treat this given subset as the set of
admissible preferences and call it the domain of the problem. Given an arbitrary nonempty
subset of bundles X¯ ⊂ X and an arbitrary preference Pi ∈ P, denote rk(Pi, X¯ ) as the k-th
ranked bundle in X¯ according to Pi, i.e., |{A ∈ X¯ : A Ri rk(Pi, X¯ )| = k.
A deterministic assignment can be presented as a matrix, whose rows are associated with
agents and columns associated with bundles. The elements are either zeros or ones, where “one”
means the corresponding agent gets the corresponding bundle and “zero” means she does not.
Each agent gets exactly one bundle, which means every row of the matrix has one non-zero
element. Notice that this does not mean every agent will get some object, since the empty set is
also treated as a bundle, i.e., ∅ ∈ X . In addition, an object x ∈ X with capacity qx is allocated
to exactly qx agents. We therefore impose no free disposal, which is a well justified assumption
for relevant applications. Deterministic assignments are formally defined below.
Definition 1. A deterministic assignment is a matrix D ∈ {0, 1}I×X such that
1. ∀ i ∈ I: ∑A∈X DiA = 1,
2. ∀ x ∈ X: ∑i∈I,x∈ADiA = qx.
The set of deterministic assignments is denoted D. The following is an example.
Example 2. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b}, qa = 1, and qb = 2. Figure 1 below depicts a
deterministic assignment which specifies that agent 1 gets bundle ab, agent 2 gets nothing, and
agent 3 gets the remaining b. 
If one restricts attention to deterministic assignments, one would expect that, in general,
the agents with the same preference will be treated unequally. For instance, in the setting of
6Since we allow the number of objects, i.e., m, be arbitrary, an object with more than n− 1 copies can always
be treated as several distinct objects, each of which has a capacity smaller than n− 1.
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12
3
ab a b ∅
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
= 1
= 2
= 1
= 1
= 1
Figure 1: A Deterministic Assignment
Example 2, if all the agents perceive the bundle ab as the best and b the second best, it is
impossible to treat them equally using only deterministic assignments.
To allow for greater flexibility in design to deal with the fairness issue, we allow the elements
of an assignment to be fractional numbers between zero and one, as below.
Definition 2. A random assignment is a matrix L ∈ [0, 1]I×X such that
1. ∀ i ∈ I: ∑A∈X LiA = 1,
2. ∀ x ∈ X: ∑i∈I,x∈A LiA = qx.
The set of random assignments is denoted L. It is evident that D ⊂ L. The following is an
example of a specific random assignment.
Example 3. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b}, qa = 1, and qb = 2. Figure 2 below depicts a
random assignment. 
1
2
3
ab a b ∅
1/6 1/6 1/2 1/6
1/6 0 1/3 1/2
1/2 0 1/3 1/6
= 1
= 2
= 1
= 1
= 1
Figure 2: A Random Assignment
The fractional numbers in a random assignment are interpreted as the probability of the cor-
responding agent getting the corresponding bundle. Hence a row associated to agent i, denoted
Li, gives the lottery over bundles for agent i. As in the above random assignment, L2 specifies
that agent 2 will get bundle ab with probability 1/6, b with probability 1/3, and empty bundle
with probability 1/2.
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For deterministic assignments, condition 2 in the definition simply imposes ex post feasibil-
ity. For random assignments, the situation is more complicated. To fully interpret it, we need to
introduce another notion below.
Definition 3. A random assignment L ∈ L is decomposable if there is a lottery over determin-
istic assignments β ∈ ∆(D) such that
L =
∑
D∈D
β(D) ·D,
where β(D) denotes the probability lottery β assigns to D.
Such a lottery β is called a decomposition of L. Generally a decomposable random assign-
ment may have multiple decompositions. The following is an example of a decomposition.
Example 4. The random assignment L in Example 3 can be decomposed as follows
ab a b ∅
1 : 1/6 1/6 1/2 1/6
2 : 1/6 0 1/3 1/2
3 : 1/2 0 1/3 1/6
 = 1/2

ab a b ∅
1 : 0 0 1 0
2 : 0 0 0 1
3 : 1 0 0 0
+ 1/6

ab a b ∅
1 : 1 0 0 0
2 : 0 0 1 0
3 : 0 0 0 1

+ 1/6

ab a b ∅
1 : 0 0 0 1
2 : 1 0 0 0
3 : 0 0 1 0
+ 1/6

ab a b ∅
1 : 0 1 0 0
2 : 0 0 1 0
3 : 0 0 1 0


For a decomposable random assignment, Condition 2 in Definition 2 requires that, for x,
the expected number of its copies that will be assigned to agents, through feasible deterministic
assignments is exactly qx. In this sense, condition 2 imposes ex ante feasibility. We will some-
times call a random assignment feasible in order to emphasize the conditions in Definition 2.
In the setting with objects, a random assignment is a bi-stochastic matrix, where ex ante
feasibility is modeled as the requirement that every column sums to one. The Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem guarantees that every random assignment of objects is decomposable. How-
ever, in the setting with bundles, ex ante feasibility becomes complicated: it is not that every
column sums to one independently but that columns sum to certain integers group by group
in a combinatorial fashion. Such complexity in feasibility makes decomposability a difficult
problem, which will be discussed in detail in Section 5.
When we restrict our attention to decomposable random assignments, expressing a random
assignment as a convex combination of feasible deterministic assignments is equivalent to ex-
pressing it as the matrix defined by Definition 2. However, our definition facilitates comparisons
of random assignments, since for an agent to compare two random assignments, it suffices to
compare two rows directly. In addition, our definition incorporates non-decomposable random
assignments, which can presumably be approximated by decomposable ones and are hence of
some interest of their own right.
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By allowing for some non-decomposable random assignments, one is allowed to design a
random assignment rule which may choose non-decomposable random assignments but perform
well in other dimensions. For example, the probabilistic serial rule, extended to the setting with
bundles, selects some non-decomposable random assignments. However, this rule guarantees
efficiency.
A random assignment rule is formally defined as a mapping which selects a random assign-
ment for every profile of admissible preferences.
Definition 4. A random assignment rule is a mapping ϕ : Dn → L.
The remainder of the section introduces four axioms that we impose on a desirable ran-
dom assignment rule. The first axiom concerns itself with decomposability, which ensures that
once a random assignment is selected, it can be decomposed as a lottery over deterministic
assignments. The other three are normative and deal with respectively fairness, incentive com-
patibility, and efficiency.
We call a random assignment rule decomposable if it selects only among decomposable
random assignments. Formally, a random assignment rule ϕ : Dn → L is decomposable if
ϕ(P ) is decomposable for every P ∈ Dn.
In addition to decomposability, we impose three normative axioms on a desirable random
assignment rule. The first deals with fairness and requires that whenever two agents report
the same preference, they get the same lottery. Formally, a rule ϕ : Dn → L satisfies equal
treatment of equals (or ETE) if for all P ∈ Dn, [Pi = Pj]⇒ [Li = Lj].
The second deals with efficiency and the third deals with incentive compatibility. However,
both of these require an assumption on how an agent compares lotteries when she is identified by
a preference on bundles. We thus need to extend a preference Pi over bundles X to a preference
over lotteries in ∆(X ). Following the standard approach, we adopt the stochastic dominance
extension, which assumes that a lottery Li ∈ ∆(X ) is at least as good as L′i ∈ ∆(X ) if, for each
bundle A ∈ X , the probability of getting a bundle that is at least as good as A given by Li is no
less than that given by L′i.
7 Formally,
Definition 5. Given Pi ∈ P, Li ∈ ∆(X ) stochastically dominates L′i ∈ ∆(X ), denoted as
Li P
sd
i L
′
i, if for all B ∈ X ∑
ARiB
LiA >
∑
ARiB
L′iA.
With the stochastic dominance extension, we define the remaining two axioms. An assign-
ment L is sd-efficient at P ∈ Dn if there exists no L′ ∈ L that Pareto dominates L, i.e., L′ 6= L
and L′i P
sd
i Li for all i ∈ I . Accordingly, a rule ϕ : Dn → L is sd-efficient if ϕ(P ) is
sd-efficient at P , for all P ∈ Dn. We address the general question of whether a random as-
signment is sd-efficient at a given profile in Section 3. Finally, a rule is sd-strategy-proof if
truth-telling is always a weakly dominant strategy in the associated preference revelation game.
Formally, a rule ϕ : Dn → L is sd-strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I , P ∈ Dn, and P ′i ∈ D,
ϕi(Pi, P−i) P sdi ϕi(P
′
i , P−i). We say a rule is desirable if it satisfies decomposability, sd-
strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals.
7This assumption is equivalent to assuming that a lottery Li is at least as good as L′i if and only if, for every
Bernoulli utility representing Pi, Li gives an expected utility that is at least as high as that is given by L′i.
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3 Efficiency
We address in this section the question of whether a given random assignment is sd-efficient
at a given preference profile. For the problem of random assignments of objects, Bogomol-
naia and Moulin (2001) provided two characterizations of sd-efficient assignments. The first
says that a random assignment is sd-efficient at a profile if and only if a particular relation on
objects is acyclic. The second is more mechanical and shows that at a profile, all sd-efficient
random assignments can be found by the simultaneous eating algorithm with varying eating
speeds. For the assignment problem of bundles, we find that neither characterization is true.
In particular, acyclicity, while still necessary, is not sufficient. A new condition called unbal-
ancedness is provided and proved equivalent to sd-efficiency in the current setting. We provide
two more conditions, which are natural modifications of unbalancedness and are referred to as
respectively strong unbalancedness and weak unbalancedness. Next, we extend the simultane-
ous eating algorithm to the bundle setting and prove that all random assignments generated by
this algorithm (with varying eating speeds) are sd-efficient. However, surprisingly we find that
there exists an sd-efficient random assignment at some profile that can not be generated by the
simultaneous eating algorithm with any eating speed.8
We begin with a modified definition of acyclicity (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)).
Definition 6. A random assignment L ∈ L is acyclic at P ∈ Pn if and only if the relation
τ(P,L) on X is acyclic where A τ(P,L) B ⇔ ∃i ∈ I such that B Pi A and LiA > 0.
The next example shows that acyclicity is no longer sufficient to guarantee sd-efficiency.
Example 5. Let A = {a, b, c}, q = (1, 1, 1), I = {1, 2}. Let the preferences of two agents be
P1 : c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
P2 : a c ab b ∅ bc ac abc
Consider random assignments L and L′ below.
c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
L1 : 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0.5
L2 : 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
L′1 : 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.5
L′2 : 0 0.2 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
We claim that L above is acyclic at P . To see this, notice that if the relation τ(P,L) has
a cycle, it must involve a preference reversal across two agents’ preferences. According to P ,
agents’ preferences coincide except between a and c. Hence a cycle of τ(P,L) requires at the
same time a τ(P,L) c and c τ(P,L) a. We show however a τ(P,L) c is not true. To see this,
notice that agent 1 who prefers c to a has no positive probability of a and that agent 2 does not
prefer c to a. Hence the relation τ(P,L) is acyclic. However L is not sd-efficient at P since it
is Pareto dominated by L′: L′ 6= L, L′1 P sd1 L1, and L′2 P sd2 L2. 
8Due to its complexity, the related context is in Appendix A.2. The readers are suggested to read the Subsec-
tion 4.2, where the probabilistic serial rule for bundles is defined, before the definition of the simultaneous eating
algorithm with varying eating speeds.
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The failure of the acyclicity to suffice for sd-efficiency occurs as we are able to implement a
sequence of probability transfers starting at L and leading to a feasible Pareto improvement. In
particular, by comparing L and L′ in the above example, we identify three probability transfers
which construct L′ from L, illustrated by Figure 3.
c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
L1: 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0.5
L2: 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
α(1, ab, c) = 0.2 α(1, ab, c) = 0.2
α(2, c, a) = 0.2
Figure 3: Probability Transfer System α
In particular, let α(1, ab, c) = 0.2 denote the probability transfer of 0.2 from (1, ab) to
(1, c) and let L¯ denote the matrix resulting from such a probability transfer on L. Since c is
preferred to ab by agent 1, she would prefer such a transfer. However, L¯ is not a feasible
random assignment. Specifically,
∑
i∈I,a∈A L¯iA = qa − 0.2,
∑
i∈I,b∈A L¯iA = qb − 0.2, and∑
i∈I,c∈A L¯iA = qc + 0.2. The net influence on the feasibility is as shown by the second column
in the following table.
α(1, ab, c) = 0.2 α(1, ∅, b) = 0.2 α(2, c, a) = 0.2 Total
a −0.2 0 +0.2 0
b −0.2 +0.2 0 0
c +0.2 0 −0.2 0
Next, we denote the remaining two transfers as respectively α(1, ∅, b) = 0.2 and α(2, c, a) =
0.2 and implement them successively starting from L¯ to obtain L′. The third and fourth columns
in the above table summarize the influence of these two transfers on feasibility. We see that the
influence of the aforementioned transfers cancel out on each row, making L′ a feasible random
assignment.
To formalize the observation above, let T = I × X × X . Then a system of probability
transfers can be represented by a mapping α : T → R+ that specifies for each triple (i, A,B)
a non-negative number α(i, A,B), which denotes a probability transfer from (i, A) to (i, B).
Given a random assignment L ∈ L, a transfer system will construct a new matrix, denoted L′,
of size |I| × |X |. Formally ∀j ∈ I and C ∈ X ,
L′jC = LjC +
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,B=C}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,A=C}
α(i, A,B).
Generally such a matrix L′ is not a feasible random assignment. In the definition below, we
focus on a particular class of systems which not only construct feasible random assignments but
also ensure that the assignments constructed dominate the original L at P .
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Definition 7. An assignment L ∈ L is unbalanced at P ∈ Pn if there is no α : T → R+ s.t.
(i) α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A,
(ii) ∀x ∈ X :∑{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B} α(i, A,B) = ∑{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A} α(i, A,B).
We say L is balanced at P if it is not unbalanced at P .
The following theorem states that unbalancedness characterizes sd-efficiency.
Theorem 1. Given P ∈ Pn and L ∈ L, L is sd-efficient at P iff L is unbalanced at P .
The formal proof is in Appendix A.1. Here we work through the logic of the proof using an
example.
The necessity part was illustrated by Example 5 where we showed that L was balanced
at P by demonstrating the existence of an α : T → R+ which satisfies (i) and (ii). More
generally, if a configuration like the one in Example 5 obtains, we can guarantee the existence
of an α : T → R+ and by implementing the probability transfers multiplied by a small positive
number, we can guarantee a feasible random assignment L′ which Pareto dominates L.
We now turn to the sufficiency argument. Suppose another random assignment L′ dominates
L at P . We need to find a mapping α : T → R+ that satisfies (i) and (ii). To do this, we first
pick an arbitrary mapping β : T → R+ that constructs L′ from L.9 Notice that by the fact that
L′ is a feasible random assignment, (ii) is satisfied automatically. If β satisfies in addition (i), it
serves as the desired α directly. However that is in general not the case since it is possible that
β(i, A,B) > 0, LiA = 0 and(or) that β(i, A,B) > 0, A Pi B.
Given an arbitrary such β, we construct a desired α from it in two steps. Each step consists
of finitely many updates upon β. In particular, the first step deals with the instances where
β(i, A,B) > 0 with LiA = 0 and finds an intermediary mapping γ : T → R+ that constructs
L′ from L and satisfies the condition γ(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0. The second step deals
with the instances where γ(i, A,B) > 0 with A Pi B and finds the desired α. The following
example illustrates the procedure.
Example 6. Let P , L, and L′ be as in Example 5, where we already stated that L′ dominates
L at P . Note that if a transfer system constructs L′ from L, it satisfies (ii). Hence it suffices to
construct a transfer system α : T → R+ which constructs L′ from L and satisfies (i). Notice
that L′ can be constructed from L by β : T → R+ illustrated by Figure 4.
In the first step, notice that β(1, a, c) = 0.2 while L1a = 0. Therefore β can not serve as a
desired probability transfer system. To deal with this undesired violation of (i) of Definition 7,
we identify β(1, ∅, a) = 0.2, which transfers probability to (1, a). Then we update β to γ
illustrated by Figure 5. It is evident that L′ is constructed from L by γ.10
9Since both L and L′ are feasible random assignments, such a β exists. In particular, for each i ∈ I , if there
is a bundle A such that L′iA > LiA, then there is a subset of bundles {Bk : k = 1, · · · ,K} ⊂ X\{A} such that
L′iBk < LiBk and
∑K
k=1 LiBk − L′iBk > L′iA − LiA.
10By the fact that L′ is constructed from L by β, such an update always exists. In general, to get such a γ, we
need multiple updates. For details, please refer to the formal proof.
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c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
L1: 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0.5
L2: 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
β(1, a, c) = 0.2
β(1, ∅, a) = 0.2
β(1, ab, b) = 0.2
β(2, c, a) = 0.2
Figure 4: Probability Transfer System β
c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
L1: 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0.5
L2: 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
γ(1, ∅, c) = 0.2
γ(1, ab, b) = 0.2
γ(2, c, a) = 0.2
Figure 5: Probability Transfer System γ
In the second step, notice that γ(1, ab, b) = 0.2 while ab P1 b. To deal with this violation
of (i) of Definition 7, we identify γ(1, ∅, c) = 0.2 and c P1 ab P1 b P1 ∅. Then we update γ
to α by replacing these two probability transfers by α(1, ∅, b) = 0.2 and α(1, ab, c) = 0.2, as
illustrated by Figure 6.11
P1:
better worse
c ab b ∅
γ(1, ∅, c) = 0.2
γ(1, ab, b) = 0.2
α(1, ab, c) = 0.2 α(1, ∅, b) = 0.2
Figure 6: Construction of α from γ
It is then easy to check that L′ is constructed from L by α and that α satisfies (i). 
We proceed by providing two more conditions, respectively strong unbalancedness and
weak unbalancedness. Weak unbalancedness is stronger than acyclicity. Strong unbalanced-
ness will be used to show that the random assignment generated by the simultaneous eating
algorithm with any eating speed is sd-efficient in Appendix A.2.
In order to define these two conditions, we introduce some notation. Fix P ∈ Pn, L ∈ L,
and a subset of triples S ⊂ T . For each object x ∈ X , let d(x,S) count the triples (i, A,B) ∈ S
11By the fact that L′1 P
sd
1 L1 and that L
′ is constructed from L by γ, we can always find such a sequence of
bundles. However, generally, this sequence may involve more than four bundles. In addition, to get such a α, we
usually need multiple updates. For details, please refer to the formal proof.
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such that x ∈ B and x 6∈ A. Recall that we interpret a triple (i, A,B) as a potential transfer
from (i, A) to (i, B). Then for every such x, there is a positive influence on the feasibility of
x when a positive transfer is implemented. (See Example 5.) In this way, d(x,S) counts the
instances of positive influence on the feasibility of x. Similarly, s(x,S) counts the instances of
negative influence on the feasibility of x. Formally
d(x,S) ≡ ∣∣{(i, A,B) ∈ S : x ∈ B\A}∣∣ and s(x,S) ≡ ∣∣{(i, A,B) ∈ S : x ∈ A\B}∣∣.
Definition 8. An assignment L ∈ L is strongly unbalanced at P ∈ Pn if there is no S ⊂ T s.t.
(i) (i, A,B) ∈ S implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A,
(ii) ∀x ∈ X: d(x,S) > 0⇔ s(x,S) > 0.
We say L is strongly balanced at P if it is not strongly unbalanced at P .
Definition 9. An assignment L ∈ L is weakly unbalanced at P ∈ Pn if there is no S ⊂ T s.t.
(i) (i, A,B) ∈ S implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A,
(ii) ∀x ∈ X: d(x,S) = s(x,S).
We say L is weakly balanced at P if it is not weakly unbalanced at P .
The following proposition establishes the logical relations among the definitions we have
mentioned so far.
Proposition 1. Strong unbalancedness =⇒6⇐= sd-efficiency =⇒6⇐= weak unbalancedness =⇒6⇐= acyclic-
ity.
Proof. We prove the proposition in three steps, each of which breaks into two parts.
Step 1.1: Strong unbalancedness =⇒ sd-efficiency. Let L ∈ L be strongly unbalanced at
P ∈ Pn. Suppose L is not sd-efficient at P . Then by Theorem 1, L is balanced at P , which
implies the existence of an α : T → R+ such that (i) α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0 and
B Pi A, (ii) ∀x ∈ X :
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B} α(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A} α(i, A,B).
Let S = {(i, A,B) ∈ T : α(i, A,B) > 0}. Then by definition, (i, A,B) ∈ S implies
LiA > 0 and B Pi A. We claim that ∀x ∈ X: d(x,S) > 0 ⇔ s(x,S) > 0. Suppose not,
let x ∈ X be such that d(x,S) > 0 and s(x,S) = 0, with which a contradiction is identified
below. (A contradiction can be identified analogously for the other case where d(x,S) = 0 and
s(x,S) > 0.) ∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A}
α(i, A,B)
=
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈B}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈A}
α(i, A,B)
=
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈B\A}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈A\B}
α(i, A,B)
=
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈B}
α(i, A,B)− 0 > 0 : contradiction.
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In the above, the first two equations follow from definitions. The third equation follows
from s(x,S) = 0 and the last inequality follows from d(x,S) > 0.
Step 1.2: Strong unbalancedness 6⇐= sd-efficiency. This is shown by the following ex-
ample. Let X = {a, b, c} and qx = 1 for all x ∈ X . Let the preference profile P and the
assignment L be as below.
P1 : ab c · · ·
P2 : c b · · ·
P3 : c a · · ·
a b c ab
L1 : 0 0 1 0
L2 : 0 1 0 0
L3 : 1 0 0 0
We show that L is sd-efficient at P . Suppose not, let L′ dominate L.
To do this, we show L′1 = L1. Suppose not, L
′
1 P
sd
1 L1 implies that ∃ 1 ∈ (0, 1] s.t.
a b c ab
L′1 : 0 0 1− 1 1
Given this, L′2 P
sd
2 L2 and L
′
3 P
sd
3 L3 imply the existence of 2, 3 ∈ [0, 1] such that
a b c ab
L′2 : 0 1− 2 2 0
L′2 : 1− 3 0 3 0
Then feasibility requires 1 + (1 − 3) = qa = 1 and 1 + (1 − 2) = qb = 1, which imply
1 = 2 = 3. This however implies 1− 1 + 2 + 3 6= 1 = qc: contradiction.
Given L′1 = L1, feasibility implies L
′
2c = L
′
3c = 0 and hence L
′
2 P
sd
2 L2 and L
′
3 P
sd
3 L3
imply L′2 = L2 and L
′
3 = L3, which means L = L
′: contradiction.
Next we show thatL is strongly unbalanced at P . To do this, let S = {(1, c, ab), (2, a, c), (3, b, c)}.
Then it is easy to verify that L is strongly unbalanced at P : (i) L1c > 0, ab P1 c; L2a > 0,
c P2 a; L3b > 0, c P3 b; (ii) d(x,S) > 0 and s(x,S) > 0 for all x ∈ X .
Step 2.1: Sd-efficiency =⇒ weak unbalancedness. By Proposition 1, it suffices to show
unbalancedness =⇒ weak unbalancedness. Suppose an assignmentL ∈ L be weakly balanced
at P ∈ Pn. Then there is a subset S ⊂ T such that (i) (i, A,B) ∈ S implies LiA > 0,
B Pi A, and (ii) ∀x ∈ X: d(x,S) = s(x,S). In the following, we construct a mapping
α : T → R+ such that (i) α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0, B Pi A, and (ii) ∀x ∈ X :∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B} α(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A} α(i, A,B).
In particular, let α(i, A,B) =  for all (i, A,B) ∈ S and α(i, A,B) = 0 otherwise, where 
is a small positive number. Then (i) is satisfied by definition and (ii) follows from the equation
below.
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∀x ∈ X :
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A}
α(i, A,B)
=
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈B}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈A}
α(i, A,B)
=
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈B\A}
α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈S:x∈A\B}
α(i, A,B)
=  · d(x,S)−  · s(x,S) = 0.
Step 2.2: Sd-efficiency 6⇐= weak unbalancedness. This is shown by the following example.
LetX = {a, b, c, d} and qx = 1 for each x ∈ X . Let the preference profile P and the assignment
L,L′ be as below.
P1 : c ∅ · · ·
P2 : b a · · ·
P3 : d b · · ·
P4 : ab c · · ·
P5 : ∅ d · · ·
a b c d ∅ ab
L1 : 0 0 0 0 1 0
L2 : 1 0 0 0 0 0
L3 : 0 1 0 0 0 0
L4 : 0 0 1 0 0 0
L5 : 0 0 0 1 0 0
a b c d ∅ ab
L′1 : 0 0  0 1−  0
L′2 : 1−   0 0 0 0
L′3 : 0 1− 2 0 2 0 0
L′4 : 0 0 1−  0 0 
L′5 : 0 0 0 1− 2 2 0
We verify that L is weakly unbalanced at P . Suppose not, let S ⊂ T be a subset such
that (i) (i, A,B) ∈ S implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A, and (ii) ∀ x ∈ X , d(x,S) = s(x,S).
Notice that for each i ∈ I , Li assigns the whole probability to the second ranked bundle ac-
cording to Pi. Hence S ⊂ {(1, ∅, c), (2, a, b), (3, b, d)), (4, c, ab), (5, d, ∅}. Next, by definition
of weak unbalancedness, whichever triple S includes, it includes all five triples in order to
make d(x,S) = s(x,S) for all x ∈ X . So S = {(1, ∅, c), (2, a, b), (3, b, d), (4, c, ab), (5, d, ∅)}.
However, d(b,S) = 2 6= 1 = s(b,S): contradiction.
We verify second that L is not sd-efficient at P by showing that L is dominated by L′. Let
 ∈ (0, 1]. Feasibility of L′ is evident. Noticing that the change from Li to L′i for each i ∈ I is
moving some probability from the second ranked bundle to the top ranked, domination is easy
to see. Hence L is not sd-efficient at P .
Step 3.1: Weak unbalancedness =⇒ acyclicity. Let L ∈ L be weakly unbalanced at
P ∈ Pn but τ(P,L) has a cycle. Then let a cycle be as follows
A1 τ(P,L) A2 τ(P,L) A3 · · ·AK−1 τ(P,L) AK τ(P,L) A1.
In addition, let ik be such that Ak+1 Pik Ak and LikAk > 0. Let S = {(ik, Ak, Ak+1) : k =
1, · · · , K}withAK+1 = A1. Fixing an arbitrary x ∈ X , we prove d(x,S) = s(x,S). If x 6∈ Ak
for all k = 1, · · · , K. By definition d(x,S) = s(x,S) = 0. Otherwise, let (ik−1, Ak−1, Ak) ∈ S
be arbitrary such that x ∈ Ak\Ak−1, it suffices to show the existence of (ik+l, Ak+l, Ak+l+1) ∈ S
such that x ∈ Ak+l\Ak+l+1. By the fact that A1, · · · , AK forms a cycle, such a triple exists.
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Step 3.2: Weak unbalancedness 6⇐= acyclicity. This is shown by the following example.
Let A = {a, b, c}, q = (1, 1, 1), I = {1, 2}. Let the preferences of two agents be
P1 : c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
P2 : a c ab b ∅ bc ac abc
Consider a random assignment L below.
c a ab b ∅ bc ac abc
L1 : 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0.5
L2 : 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
We have stated in Example 5 thatL is acyclic at P . However, let S = {(1, ab, c), (1, ∅, b), (2, c, a)}.
We have c P1 ab, L1ab > 0, b P1 ∅, L1∅ > 0, a P2 c, and L2c > 0. In addition, by simply
counting, d(x,S) = s(x,S) = 1 for all x ∈ {a, b, c}. Hence L is not weakly balanced at P . 
4 An Existence Result
In the classical random assignment problem, two extensively studied rules are the random
serial dictatorship rule (or RSD, see Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)) and the probabilistic
serial rule (or PS, see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)). It is well known that, in the classical
random assignment model, both rules treat equals equally. The PS rule is sd-efficient but not sd-
strategy-proof while the RSD rule is sd-strategy-proof but not sd-efficient. Due to their distinct
properties, these two rules are treated as competing alternatives for applications.
This section consists of five subsections. Subsection 4.1 and 4.2 extend the RSD rule and
the PS rule to the setting with bundles. Their performance in the current setting is summarized
by Propositions 2 and 3. Subsection 4.3 introduces the domain of essentially monotonic pref-
erences. Subsection 4.4 proves that the above mentioned rules are equivalent on this domain
(Theorem 2). Such a surprising equivalence gives a desirable existence result: there exists a de-
composable, sd-efficient, sd-strategy-proof, and equal-treatment-of-equals random assignment
rule on the essentially monotonic domain. Lastly, Subsection 4.5 presents a general impossibil-
ity result on the universal domain (Proposition 4).
4.1 The Random Serial Dictatorship Rule for Bundles
In the classical random assignment model, the random serial dictatorship rule (Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)) is defined as the equally weighted average of serial dictatorship
rules (Svensson (1999)), each of which is a deterministic rule parameterized by an ordering of
agents. Such an ordering is defined as a one-to-one mapping σ : {1, · · · , n} → I , where σ(1)
denotes the agent ordered the first, σ(2) the second, and so on. The corresponding serial dic-
tatorship rule lets the agents pick their respectively favorite objects sequentially. In particular,
σ(1) gets her favorite object, σ(2) gets her favorite within the remaining objects, and so on.
For the setting with bundles, a seemingly “natural” extension of the serial dictatorship rule
is one where every agent takes a bundle rather than an object. However, the following example
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indicates that such an extension may specify an infeasible assignment because of its conflict
with the no free disposal requirement.
Example 7. Consider the situation where X = {a, b}, qa = qb = 1, and I = {1, 2}. Consider
a preference profile where agents have the same preference: a  ∅  ab  b. Let σ be an
ordering of agents such that σ(1) = 1 and σ(2) = 2.
In the first step, the set of available bundles is {ab, a, b, ∅}. Hence agent 1 will take a. Then
the set of available bundles for agent 2 will be {b, ∅}, from which agent 2 will choose ∅. Then
the deterministic assignment will be D1a = D2∅ = 1. However, this is not feasible since b is not
assigned. 
To deal with the problem, we introduce for each object x ∈ X , an “opposite object”, denoted
as x¯, and refer to it as “not x.” In addition, we will say x¯ ∈ A if x 6∈ A. For each x¯, we define
its capacity as n − qx and whenever an agent takes a bundle A which does not contain x, we
deduct the available units of x¯ by one. Accordingly, we define a bundle A as available, if for
every x ∈ X , x ∈ A implies that there are still some units of x available and x 6∈ A implies
that there is still some units of x¯ available. This rules out the infeasible assignments seen in
Example 7 since whenever an agent takes a bundle not containing x, the available units of each
opposite object x¯ will be less. So there is always a step when no more x¯ will be available and
hence some agent has to take x.
We present the serial dictatorship rule for bundles on an arbitrary domain below, where qv−1x
and qv−1x¯ denote respectively the available units of x and x¯ for the v-th agent, which then defines
as X v−1 the available bundles.
Definition 10. Serial dictatorship for bundles (SDB) is a deterministic assignment rule SDBσ :
Dn → D parameterized by an ordering of agents σ : {1, 2, · · · , n} → I , such that given a pref-
erence profile P ∈ Dn, SDBσ(P ) = D, specified by the following.
Let X 0 = X , q0x = qx, and q0x¯ = n− qx.
For v = 1, · · · , n,
Dσ(v)A =
{
1 if A = r1(Pσ(v),X v−1)
0 otherwise
;
qvx = q
v−1
x − 1,∀x ∈ r1(Pσ(v),X v−1);
qvx¯ = q
v−1
x¯ − 1,∀x 6∈ r1(Pσ(v),X v−1);
X v = X v−1\{A ∈ X v−1 : ∃x ∈ X s.t. [x ∈ A, qvx = 0] or [x 6∈ A, qvx¯ = 0]}.
To illustrate that the SDB rule is well-defined, we present the following example.
Example 8. Consider the setting of Example 7. The capacities of the objects are as follows:
q0a = 1, q
0
b = 1, q
0
a¯ = 1, q
0
b¯
= 1.
For agent 1, the set of available bundles is X 0 = {ab, a, b, ∅}, from which she takes a. Then
the capacities of objects will be updated as follows:
q1a = q
0
a − 1 = 0, q1b = q0b = 1, q1a¯ = q0a¯ = 1, q1b¯ = q0b¯ − 1 = 0.
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Hence the set of available bundles for agent 2 is X 1 = {b}. This indicates that agent 2 has
to take b and the final assignment is D below.
D =

ab a b ∅
1 : 0 1 0 0
2 : 0 0 1 0


With the above well-defined serial dictatorship rules, we define the random serial dictator-
ship rule as the equally weighted combination of these deterministic rules.
Definition 11. Random serial dictatorship for bundles (RSDB) is a random assignment rule
RSDB : Dn → L such that given a preference profile P ∈ Dn,
RSDB(P ) =
1
|Σ|
∑
σ∈Σ
SDBσ(P ).
The performance of the RSDB rule on the universal domain is summarized below.
Proposition 2. The RSDB rule on the universal domain satisfies decomposability, sd-strategy-
proofness, equal treatment of equals but violates sd-efficiency.
Proof. First, by construction the RSDB rule is decomposable, because it is a lottery over de-
terministic assignment rules. Second, the RSDB rule is sd-strategy-proof, because each SDB
rule is sd-strategy-proof and that sd-strategy-proofness is preserved under linear combinations.
Third, the RSDB rule treats equals equally, because the various orderings of agents are equally
weighted.
The following example proves that the RSDB rule is not sd-efficient. This example is a
modification of an example in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
Let I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, X = {a, b, c}, and qa = qb = qc = 1. Consider the preference profile
P given below. Then the random assignment specified by the RSDB rule is below, where B
denotes an arbitrary bundle different from ab, c, and ∅. The reader can verify that it is not
sd-efficient because it is dominated by the random assignment L.
P1, P2 : ab c ∅ · · ·
P3, P4 : c ab ∅ · · ·
RSDB(P ) =

ab c ∅ B
1, 2 : 5/12 1/12 1/2 0
3, 4 : 1/12 5/12 1/2 0
 L =

ab c ∅ B
1, 2 : 1/2 0 1/2 0
3, 4 : 0 1/2 1/2 0


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4.2 The Probabilistic Serial Rule for Bundles
The PS rule in the classical random assignment model (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001))
is a special case of the so-called simultaneous eating algorithm, where all agents eat at the
uniform speed. It treats the objects as if they are infinitely divisible and proceeds as follows:
all the agents eat their respectively favorite objects at the uniform speed, until some object is
exhausted; thereafter, agents eat their respectively favorite objects among the available ones,
still at the uniform speed, until some other object is exhausted; this procedure is repeated until
all the objects are exhausted. Finally, the share of an object eaten by an agent is interpreted as
the probability that this agent gets this object.
The PS rule can be naturally extended to the setting with bundles, where every agent eats a
bundle rather than an object. In particular, an agent eating a bundle means that she simultane-
ously eats every object contained in that bundle. As in the definition of the SDB rule, here too
we introduce for each x ∈ X an opposite object x¯. An agent eating a bundle A is equivalent
to saying that she eats every x such that x ∈ A and every x¯ such that x 6∈ A. We present the
probabilistic serial rule for bundles below, where rv−1x and r
v−1
x¯ denote respectively the avail-
able shares of x and x¯ for the v-th step. Accordingly, X v−1 denotes the available bundles for
the v-th step. In particular, the length of the v-th step, i.e., tv − tv−1, is defined as the shortest
time needed to exhaust at least one in x’s and x¯’s.
Definition 12. Probabilistic serial rule for bundles (PSB) is a random assignment rule PSB :
Dn → L such that given a preference profile P ∈ Dn, PSB(P ) ≡ Lv¯ where Lv¯ is generated by
the following algorithm.
Let t0 = 0, X 0 = X , r0x = qx and r0x¯ = n− qx for all x ∈ X .
Let in addition L0 be a matrix of size n× |X | with all zeros.
For v = 1, · · · , v¯,
Ivx ≡ {i ∈ I : x ∈ r1(Pi,X v−1)},∀x ∈ X;
Ivx¯ ≡ I\Ivx ,∀x ∈ X;
tv ≡ tv−1 + min
{{
rv−1x
|Ivx |
: rv−1x > 0
}⋃{rv−1x¯
|Ivx¯ |
: rv−1x¯ > 0
}}
;
LviA ≡ Lv−1iA +
{
tv − tv−1, if A = r1(Pi,X v−1)
0, otherwise
,∀i ∈ I, A ∈ X v−1;
rvx ≡ rv−1x − (tv − tv−1) · |Ivx |,∀x ∈ X;
rvx¯ ≡ rv−1x¯ − (tv − tv−1) · |Ivx¯ |,∀x ∈ X;
X v ≡ X v−1\{A ∈ X v−1 : ∃x ∈ X s.t. [x ∈ A, rvx = 0] or [x 6∈ A, rvx¯ = 0]};
where v¯ is identified by X v¯ = ∅.
The following example illustrates an eating procedure.
21
Example 9. Let X = {a, b, c}, qx = 1 ∀x ∈ X , and I = {1, 2, 3}. Let the preference profile P
be as below.
P1 : ab abc · · · · · ·
P2 : ∅ ab c · · ·
P3 : ∅ ab c · · ·
∅ ab abc c
L1 : 0 2/3 1/3 0
L2 : 2/3 0 0 1/3
L3 : 2/3 0 0 1/3
Initially the available shares are r0a = r
0
b = r
0
c = 1 and r
0
a¯ = r
0
b¯
= r0c¯ = 2 and hence every
bundle is available.
In the first period, agent 1 eats bundle ab and agents 2 and 3 eat ∅. So the sets of agents
who eat various available objects are as follows:
I1a = {1} I1b = {1} I1c = ∅
I1a¯ = {2, 3} I1b¯ = {2, 3} I1c¯ = {1, 2, 3}.
The object c¯ will be exhausted first since r0c¯/|I1c¯ | = 2/3 is the smallest among available
objects. This also identifies the end of the first period, i.e., t1 = 2/3. Hence in the first period
agent 1 eats 2/3 of ab and agents 2 and 3 each eats 2/3 of ∅. We now update the available
shares of objects as below
r1a = r
0
a − 2/3 · |I1a | = 1/3 r1a¯ = r0a¯ − 2/3 · |I1a¯ | = 2/3
r1b = r
0
b − 2/3 · |I1b | = 1/3 r1b¯ = r0b¯ − 2/3 · |I1b¯ | = 2/3
r1c = r
0
c − 2/3 · |I1c | = 1 r1c¯ = r0c¯ − 2/3 · |I1c¯ | = 0.
So, except for c¯, all the other objects are still available, which defines the available bundles
as X 1 = {abc, ac, bc, c}. In particular, the set ∅ is not available any more.
In the second period, agent 1 eats abc, which is her favorite in X 1 and agents 2 and 3 eat
c, which is their favorite in X 1. The sets of agents who eat various available objects are as
follows:
I2a = {1} I2b = {1} I2c = {1, 2, 3}
I2a¯ = {2, 3} I2b¯ = {2, 3} I2c¯ = ∅.
Then all the objects will be exhausted at the same time t2 = t1 + 1/3 = 1 since 1/3 =
r1a/|I2a | = r1b/|I2b | = r1c/|I2c | = r1a¯/|I2a¯ | = r1b¯/|I2b¯ |. In this period agent 1 eats 1/3 of abc
and each of agents 2 and 3 eats 1/3 of c. At the end of the second period, all the objects are
exhausted and hence the algorithm terminates. Hence the resulting random assignment is L
presented above. 
As the above example indicates, the PSB rule is well-defined. We proceed by presenting the
following example to show that this rule is not sd-strategy-proof on the universal domain.
Example 10. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b}, and qa = qb = 1. Two preferences are as below.
P˜i : ab  a  b  ∅
Pˆi : a  ab  b  ∅
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Let two preference profiles be P = (P˜1, P˜2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4) and P ′ = (Pˆ1, P˜2, Pˆ3, Pˆ4). The following
are the corresponding assignments specified by the PSB rule. In particular, L = PSB(P ) and
L′ = PSB(P ′).
ab a b ∅
L1 : 1/4 0 1/8 5/8
L2 : 1/4 0 1/8 5/8
L3 : 0 1/4 1/8 5/8
L4 : 0 1/4 1/8 5/8
ab a b ∅
L′1 : 0 1/4 3/16 9/16
L′2 : 1/4 0 3/16 9/16
L′3 : 0 1/4 3/16 9/16
L′4 : 0 1/4 3/16 9/16
Across the two preference profiles, agent 1 is the unique deviator. Notice that L′1ab + L
′
1a +
L′1b = 7/16 > 6/16 = L1ab+L1a+L1b, which means that by misreporting P
′
1, agent 1 receives
a higher probability of getting a bundle better than ∅. Hence the PSB rule is manipulable on
any domain containing these two preferences, including the universal domain. 
The performance of this rule on the universal domain is summarized below.
Proposition 3. The PSB rule on the universal domain satisfies sd-efficiency and equal treatment
of equals but violates sd-strategy-proofness and decomposability.
Proof. The previous example shows that the PSB rule is not sd-strategy-proof on the universal
domain. We use Example 15 in Section 5 to demonstrate that the PSB rule is not decomposable.
The fact that the PSB rule treats equals equally follows from the fact that all the agents have the
same eating speed at every point in time.
Now we turn to proving the efficiency claim. Let P ∈ Pn and L = PSB(P ). We show
that L is sd-efficient at P . To do so, ∀ x ∈ X , let t(x) be the time when x is depleted, i.e.,
t(x) ≡ min{tv : rvx 6 0}. Similarly, ∀ x ∈ X , let t(x¯) be the time when x¯ is depleted, i.e.,
t(x¯) ≡ min{tv : rvx¯ 6 0}. We consider two cases.
Case 1: ∀x ∈ X , t(x) 6 t(x¯). Lemma 1 below considers this case.
Lemma 1. Let P ∈ Pn and L = PSB(P ). If, ∀x ∈ X , t(x) 6 t(x¯), L is sd-efficient at P .
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose L is not sd-efficient at P . Then by
Proposition 1, L is strongly balanced at P . Put otherwise, there is a subset S ⊂ T such that (i)
(i, A,B) ∈ S implies B Pi A and LiA > 0; (ii) ∀x ∈ X , [∃(i, A,B) ∈ S s.t. x ∈ A\B] ⇔
[∃(i, A,B) ∈ S s.t. x ∈ B\A]. For each i ∈ I and A ∈ X such that LiA > 0, let t(i, A) denote
the time when agent i starts to consume A. Formally, t(i, A) ≡ min{t(x) : x ∈ A} − LiA.
Pick an arbitrary (i1, A1, B1) ∈ S, by definition, B1 Pi1 A1 and Li1A1 > 0. Hence at
the time when agent i1 starts to consume A1, i.e., t(i1, A1), B1 is already depleted. Then
the assumption that, ∀ x ∈ X , t(x) 6 t(x¯), implies the existence of x1 ∈ B1\A1 such that
t(x1) 6 t(i1, A1). Strong balancedness then implies the existence of (i2, A2, B2) ∈ S such that
x1 ∈ A2\B2. Then Li2A2 > 0 implies t(i2, A2) < t(x1). Similarly, let x2 ∈ B2\A2 be arbitrary
such that t(x2) 6 t(i2, A2). Hence t(x2) 6 t(i2, A2) < t(x1). We repeat the procedure to find
x3, A3, and i3 such that t(x3) 6 t(i3, A3) < t(x2) 6 t(i2, A2) < t(x1). If x3 = x1, we have a
contradiction. Otherwise, we repeat the procedure to find x4, and so on. Finally, the finiteness
of X implies the existence of x such that t(x) < t(x): contradiction. 
23
Case 2: Let X¯ ≡ {x ∈ X : t(x) > t(x¯)} be nonempty. Let E ≡ (I,X, q) denote the model
setting. We define a new model E ′ ≡ (I, Y, p) such that (i) the set of agents is the same as the
original model, and (ii) the set of objects Y and their capacities p are associated to X and q via
an arbitrary bijection f : Y → X , as follows.
py =
qf(y), f(y) ∈ X\X¯n− qf(y), f(y) ∈ X¯
Thus if an object y ∈ Y is mapped to an object x not in X¯ , its capacity is the same as x.
Otherwise, its capacity is defined as n minus the capacity of x. For E and E ′, the set of bundles
are denoted as X and Y respectively. It is evident that |X | = |Y|. In addition, the set of random
assignments are denoted as L and L′ respectively. We now define a mapping g : Y → X such
that ∀ A ∈ Y , g(A) = B ∈ X if and only if, ∀y ∈ Y ,
f(y) ∈ B, if either [f(y) ∈ X\X¯ and y ∈ A] or [f(y) ∈ X¯ and y 6∈ A]
f(y) 6∈ B, otherwise.
(1)
For a better understanding of the construction, we illustrate in Example 11 the construction
with a specific model setting. One can verify that g is a bijection. For the new model E ′,
we specify a profile of preferences on Y , denoted as P ′ = (P ′i )i∈I , and a random assignment
L′ ∈ L′. In particular, for all i ∈ I and A,B ∈ Y , A Pi′ B if and only if g(A) Pi g(B). For all
i ∈ I and A ∈ Y , L′iA = Lig(A).
We now make the following two claims.
Claim 1: L′ is sd-efficient at P ′ in E ′⇒ L is sd-efficient at P in E .
We prove the contrapositive statement. Let L be not sd-efficient at P in E . Then, by defini-
tion, ∃ L˜ ∈ L such that L˜ 6= L and L˜i P sdi Li for all i ∈ I . We construct a matrix L˜′ ∈ [0, 1]I×Y
such that, ∀ i ∈ I and A ∈ Y , L˜′iA = L˜ig(A). We prove the following three statements.
1. L˜′ is a random assignment in E ′, i.e., L˜′ ∈ L′.
To see this, note that, ∀i ∈ I ,∑
A∈Y
L˜′iA =
∑
A∈Y
L˜ig(A) =
∑
A∈X
L˜iA = 1.
Moreover, ∀ y ∈ Y ,
f(y) ∈ X\X¯ : ∑
i∈I,y∈A
L˜′iA =
∑
i∈I,y∈A
L˜ig(A) ( by L˜′iA = L˜ig(A))
=
∑
i∈I,f(y)∈A
L˜iA ( by the definition of g)
= qf(y) ( byL˜ ∈ L)
= py. ( by the definition of p)
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f(y) ∈ X¯ : ∑
i∈I,y∈A
L˜′iA =
∑
i∈I,y∈A
L˜ig(A) ( by L˜′iA = L˜ig(A))
=
∑
i∈I,f(y)6∈A
L˜iA ( by the definition of g)
= n− ∑
i∈I,f(y)∈A
L˜iA = n− qf(y) ( byL˜ ∈ L)
= py. ( by the definition of p)
2. L˜′ 6= L′. This is implied by the fact that L˜ 6= L and that g is a bijection.
3. ∀ i ∈ I , L˜′i P ′sdi L′i. Given ∀ i ∈ I , B ∈ Y , and the fact that L˜i P sdi Li,∑
{A∈Y:AR′iB}
L˜′iA −
∑
{A∈Y:AR′iB}
L′iA =
∑
{g(A)∈X :g(A)Rig(B)}
L˜iA −
∑
{g(A)∈X :g(A)Rig(B)}
LiA > 0.
The above three statements together imply that L′ is not sd-efficient at P ′ in E ′.
Claim 2: For E ′, L′ = PSB(P ′) and t(y) 6 t(y¯) for all y ∈ Y .
By construction, when the PSB rule is applied to P ′ in E ′, if f(y) ∈ X\X¯ , y mimics f(y)
when the PSB rule is applied to P in E . If instead f(y) ∈ X¯ , y¯ mimics f(y) when the PSB rule
is applied to P in E . Hence, ∀ i ∈ I , y ∈ Y such that f(y) ∈ X\X¯ , and any point in time, agent
i consumes y when the PSB rule is applied to P ′ in E ′ if and only if agent i consumes f(y)
when the PSB rule is applied to P in E . So t′(y) = t(x) 6 t(x¯) = t′(y¯), where t′(y) denote
the point in time when object y is depleted and x ∈ X such that f(y) = x. On the contrary, ∀
i ∈ I , y ∈ Y such that f(y) ∈ X¯ , and any point in time, agent i consumes y when the PSB rule
is applied to P ′ in E ′ if and only if agent i consumes x¯ when the PSB rule is applied to P in E ,
where x = f(y). So t′(y) = t(x¯) 6 t(x) = t′(y¯), where x ∈ X such that f(y) = x.
The statement that L = PSB(P ) is sd-efficient at P for Case 2 is now implied by Claims
1, 2 and Lemma 1. In particular, Claim 2 and Lemma 1 imply that L′ is sd-efficient at P ′ in E ′.
Then Claim 1 implies that L is sd-efficient at P in E . 
Example 11. Consider the setting of Example 9. In particular, the model is denoted as E =
(I,X, q), where I = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b, c}, and qa = qb = qc = 1. According to the eating
procedure illustrated in Example 9, t(a) = t(a¯) = 1, t(b) = t(b¯) = 1, t(c¯) = 2/3 < 1 = t(c).
Hence, let X¯ = {c}. Let in addition, E ′ = (I, Y, p) be the new model where Y = {x, y, z},
px = qa = 1, py = qb = 1, and pz = 3 − qc = 2. Let f : {x, y, z} → {a, b, c} be such that
f(x) = a, f(y) = b, and f(z) = c. Given this, we map the bundles in E ′ to the ones in E
according to the definition of g in (1).
xy xyz x y xz yz ∅ z
g : ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
abc ab ac bc a b c ∅
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Given the preference profile P and the PSB assignment L in E , we construct the profile P ′
and a matrix L′ in E ′ via g.
P ′1 : xyz xy · · · · · ·
P ′2 : z xyz ∅ · · ·
P ′3 : z xyz ∅ · · ·
z xyz xy ∅
L′1 : 0 2/3 1/3 0
L′2 : 2/3 0 0 1/3
L′3 : 2/3 0 0 1/3
One can easily verify that L′ is exactly the random assignment generated by applying the
PSB rule to P ′. One can also verify that in the corresponding eating procedure, everyone of the
objects, x, y, and z in particular, is depleted before its opposite object. 
In the remainder of this subsection, we illustrate an implication of our feasibility require-
ment on designing a desirable random assignment rule: a possibility result in the setting with
objects fails in the setting with bundles. In the setting with objects, Liu (2017) proved that
the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on the sequentially dichotomous domain, which is generated
by lexicographically checking a fixed list of properties. We first introduce the sequentially
dichotomous domain to the current setting.
Let x1, x2, · · · , xm be a fixed ordering of objects. To simplify notation, we denote a bundle
as a 0-1 vector of length m, where a “one” at the t-th position means this bundle contains xt
and a “zero” means not. For example A = (1, 0, 0, 1) is equivalent to A = x1x4. For each
bundle A and each index t = 1, · · · ,m, we write At as its t-th element and At the sequence of
the first t elements. For example, for the bundle A = (1, 0, 0, 1), A2 = 0 and A3 = (1, 0, 0).
A preference is sequentially dichotomous if the bundles are ranked in the following sequential
way. First, either every bundle containing x1 is better than every bundle that does not, or the
other way around. Next, within the bundles containing x1, either every bundle containing x2 is
better than every bundle that does not, or the other way around. Similarly, within the bundles
that do not contain x1, either every one containing x2 is better than every one that does not, or
the other way around. The preference is refined by checking sequentially for x3, x4, and so on.
Formally, a preference Pi ∈ P is sequentially dichotomous if
1. either [∀A,B ∈ X s.t. A1 = 1, B1 = 0, A Pi B] or [∀A,B ∈ X s.t. A1 = 1, B1 =
0, B Pi A];
2. ∀t = 2, · · · ,m and ∀α ∈ {0, 1}t−1, either [∀A,B ∈ X s.t. At−1 = Bt−1 = α,At =
1, Bt = 0, A Pi B] or [∀A,B ∈ X s.t. At−1 = Bt−1 = α,At = 1, Bt = 0, B Pi A].
In this manner, the preference structure of the sequentially dichotomous domain of Liu
(2017) is directly introduced into the bundle setting. One can find that, by treating “contain-
ing xt” as the t-th property, the above given definition is equivalent to the original one. The
preferences P˜i and Pˆi in Example 10 are instances of sequentially dichotomous preferences.
In particular, agents compare the bundles by checking first whether the bundle contains a and
second whether it contains b. Both preferences prefer the bundles containing a (ab and a) to the
bundles that do not (b and ∅). Then between ab and a, P˜i prefers the one containing b while Pˆi
prefers the one that does not. Between b and ∅, both preferences prefer the one containing b.
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Hence the manipulation of the PSB rule in Example 10 indicates that the possibility result
on the sequentially dichotomous domain in the classical random assignment model fails in the
setting with bundles. This failure occurs exactly because the definition of feasibility is modified.
If we treat the four bundles as distinct objects, feasibility of random assignments of individual
objects now dictates that every column sums to one. Then the random assignments generated
by the PS rule for the above profiles would be as follows.
ab a b ∅
L1 : 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
L2 : 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
L3 : 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
L4 : 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
ab a b ∅
L′1 : 1/6 1/3 1/4 1/4
L′2 : 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
L′3 : 1/6 1/3 1/4 1/4
L′4 : 1/6 1/3 1/4 1/4
It is evident that agent 1’s misreport is no longer profitable. To summarize, it follows that
the change in the feasibility requirement from the classical setting to the setting with bundles
has a significant implication on possibilities of designing a desirable rule, in that a previously
known possibility result fails.
4.3 The Essentially Monotonic Preferences
In order to introduce our preference restriction, we identify first the following sequence of
bundles and integers. We call them critical bundles and critical capacities.
A1 ≡ X, d1 ≡ min{qx : x ∈ X},
A2 ≡ {x ∈ X : qx > d1}, d2 ≡ min{qx − d1 : qx > d1},
...
...
Ak ≡
{
x ∈ X : qx >
∑k−1
l=1 dl
}
, dk ≡ min
{
qx −
∑k−1
l=1 dl : qx >
∑k−1
l=1 dl
}
,
...
...
AK−1 ≡
{
x ∈ X : qx >
∑K−2
l=1 dl
}
, dK−1 ≡ min
{
qx −
∑K−2
l=1 dl : qx >
∑K−2
l=1 dl
}
,
AK ≡
{
x ∈ X : qx >
∑K−1
l=1 dl
}
, dK ≡ n−
∑K−1
l=1 dl,
where K is identified by AK = ∅. It is evident that dK−1 = max{qx : x ∈ X}. By the structure
above, X = A1 ' A2 ' · · · ' AK−1 ' AK = ∅.
Example 12. Consider the situations where objects have the same number of copies, i.e., qx =
qy for all x, y ∈ X , the corresponding critical bundles and capacities are as below.
A1 = X d1 = qx
A2 = ∅ d2 = n− qx

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Example 13. Consider a situation where n = 6, X = {a, b, c}, qa = 4, qb = 3, and qc = 2.
Then the critical bundles and capacities are as follows.
A1 = abc d1 = 2
A2 = ab d2 = 1
A3 = a d3 = 1
A4 = ∅ d4 = 2.

A preference is called essentially monotonic if whenever a bundle is a proper subset of a
critical bundle, it is less preferred to this critical bundle. Formally
Definition 13. A preference Pi ∈ P is essentially monotonic if for any critical bundle Ak and
any A ∈ X such that A $ Ak, Ak Pi A.
Let DEM ⊂ P be the set of all essentially monotonic preferences and call it the essen-
tially monotonic domain. As shown by Examples 12 and 13, the more capacities vary, the
more critical bundles will be identified. Hence more restrictions will be imposed on essentially
monotonic preferences and DEM will be smaller.
Among the preference restrictions studied in the setting with bundles, two of them are
closely related to essentially monotonicity: monotonicity (Pa´pai, 2000b) and separability
(Le Breton and Sen, 1999). A preference is monotonic if whenever a bundle is a proper subset
of another bundle, the former is less preferred than the later. Formally, ∀A,B ∈ X , B $ A
⇒ A Pi B. A preference is separable if adding an additional object to a bundle is preferred if
and only if the object itself is preferred to the empty bundle. Formally, ∀A ∈ X and x ∈ X\A,
A ∪ {x} Pi A if and only if x Pi ∅.
Monotonic Separable
Essentially
Monotonic
Figure 7: The Relationship among Preference Restrictions
Figure 7 shows the relationship. By definition, essential monotonicity is strictly weaker
than monotonicity because the requirement that if a bundle is contained in a critical bundle it
is less preferred is imposed only for critical bundles. This relation is true independent of the
capacities. (Recall that the size of the essentially monotonic domain varies with the capaci-
ties.) Consider the critical bundles in Example 12, essential monotonicity requires only that the
whole bundle, X , is the top ranked bundle. But monotonicity requires much more than that and
hence the monotonic domain contains much fewer preferences than the essentially monotonic
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domain. For another instance, consider the critical bundles in Example 13, essential mono-
tonicity requires (i) the whole set X is top ranked, (ii) bundles a, b, and ∅ are less preferred than
ab, and (iii) ∅ is less preferred than a. Hence essential monotonicity imposes less structure on
preferences than does monotonicity.
The essentially monotonic domain and the separable domain overlap with each other but
no one contains the other. This relation is also true independent of the capacities. Consider
Example 13 where there are totally 3 objects and 4 critical bundles. Recall that given the object
set, these capacities identify a maximal set of critical bundles. In other words, the resulting
essentially monotonic domain is minimal. Even in this case, there still exists a preference, Pi
below, which is essentially monotonic but not separable. The critical bundles are underlined,
from which essential monotonicity can be verified. To see that Pi is non-separable, notice that
∅ Pi c but ac Pi a. In addition P ′i below is a preference which is separable but not essentially
monotonic.
Pi : abc  ab  ac  bc  a  b  ∅  c
P ′i : ∅  a  b  c  ab  ac  bc  abc
4.4 The Equivalence
This subsection shows that the RSDB rule and the PSB rule select the same random assign-
ment for any arbitrary profile of essentially monotonic preferences.
We present an example below.
Example 14. Consider the setting of Example 13. Assume that all six agents have the same
preference below, where the critical bundles are underlined.
Pi : abc c ac ab b a ∅ bc.
The reader can verify that both the RSDB rule and the PSB rule specify a random assignment
where all agents have the same lottery as follows.
abc c ac ab b a ∅ bc
Li : 1/3 0 0 1/6 0 1/6 1/3 0

Remark 1. Recall that, in order to fully allocate the unwanted objects, we introduced an oppo-
site object x¯ for each x ∈ X . In addition, in the definition of the RSDB rule and the PSB rule,
one needs to keep track of the availability of every x and every x¯. As illustrated by Example 7,
this is because, in general, there could be “goods” (a in Example 7) and “bads” (b in Example 7)
at the same time. However, under essential monotonicity, objects are either all goods or all bads.
In the case where they are all goods, there is no need to keep track of the availability of opposite
objects. This can be seen when one verifies the random assignment in Example 14 as the result
of both the RSDB rule and the PSB rule. In the cases where objects are all bads, one can easily
construct an imaginary problem, as shown in Subsection 1.1, and hence the analogous logic
applies.
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It turns out that the above example is not a coincidence but true for all profiles of essentially
monotonic preferences.
Theorem 2. The RSDB rule is equivalent to the PSB rule on the essentially monotonic domain.
Proof. Let P ∈ DnEM be an arbitrary profile of essentially monotonic preferences. We show
∀i ∈ I , RSDBi(P ) = PSBi(P ) = Li as below, where B denotes a bundle not included in the
critical bundles A1, · · · , AK .
A1 A2 · · · AK−1 AK B
Li :
d1
n
d2
n
· · · dK−1
n
dK
n
0
The fact that PSBi(P ) = Li is seen as follows: from the beginning all agents eat their
commonly favorite bundle, X , which will be exhausted at d1/n. Thereafter, within the available
bundles, essential monotonicity implies that the favorite bundle of agents is commonly A2. So
all agent start to eat A2, which will then be exhausted at d1/n + d2/n. The iteration goes
on until d1/n + · · · + dK−1/n, when all the objects are depleted. Then every agent receives
1− (d1/n+ · · ·+ dK−1/n) probability on ∅, which is equivalent to specifying for each agent i
Li∅ = dK/n.
To seeRSDBi(P ) = Li, notice that given an arbitrary ordering σ of agents, SDBσσ(i)(P ) =
X for all i = 1, · · · , d1. In other words, each of the first d1 agents will take their commonly
favorite bundle X . Thereafter, the agents ordered from d1 + 1 to d1 + d2 will take A2 since
essential monotonicity implies that this is their favorite bundle in the available ones. This argu-
ment continues and gives that SDBσσ(i)(P ) = Ak for all i = d1 + · · · + dk−1 + 1, d1 + · · · +
dk−1 + 2, · · · , d1 + · · · + dk−1 + dk and all k = 2, · · · , K. As the equally weighted average
of all serial dictatorship rules, for an arbitrary agent, there is probability 1/n to be ordered on
each of n positions: There are a total of n! orderings of agents, among which there are (n− 1)!
orderings where agent i is ordered at the k-th position. Hence RSDBi(P ) = Li.
Note that the random assignment L is determined by the critical bundles and critical capac-
ities. In particular, it is independent of the preferences in P . Hence, we have proved that these
two rules degenerate to a constant rule on the essentially monotonic domain. 
The above equivalence gives the following result on the existence of a desirable rule.
Corollary 1. There is a decomposable random assignment rule on the essentially monotonic
domain satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals.
Remark 2. A by-product of Theorem 2 is that the PSB rule and the RSDB rule both degenerate
to a constant rule. In other words, given a specific problem, we simply identify the critical
bundles and then allocate equally these bundles, regardless of the preferences of agents. As
mentioned in the introduction, the fact that sd-efficiency is preserved by such a simple constant
assignment on such a large domain comes as a surprise. 
4.5 Impossibility
This subsection presents an impossibility on the universal domain. Recall that the capacities
of objects are collected in a vector q = (qx)x∈X . Given q, we identify the critical bundles
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A1, · · · , AK and in particular denote K as the number of critical bundles. Since the whole
bundle X and the empty bundle ∅ are identified as critical bundles no matter what the capacity
vector q is, K > 2. In principle, the more capacities vary, the larger K is. Below, we present a
general impossibility, which states that when there are at least four critical bundles, no rule on
the universal domain satisfies sd-strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and sd-envy-freeness at the
same time. Sd-envy-freeness is a fairness axiom stronger than equal treatment of equals and
requires that an agent always weakly prefers her own lottery to any other’s. Formally, a rule
ϕ : Dn → L is sd-envy-free if ∀P ∈ Dn and i, j ∈ I , ϕi(P ) P sdi ϕj(P ).
Proposition 4. Given K > 4. There is no sd-strategy-proof, sd-efficient, and sd-envy-free rule
on the universal domain.
Proof. Recall that the number of critical bundles is at most 1 + max{qx : x ∈ X}. In addition,
we require qx 6 n − 1 for all x ∈ X . Hence, by construction, n > K > 4. Let ϕ :
Pn → L be an sd-strategy-proof, sd-efficient, and sd-envy-free rule. In the following, we
construct four preference profiles P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4, and then characterize the random assignments
ϕ(P 1), ϕ(P 2), ϕ(P 3), ϕ(P 4). Finally, a contradiction against feasibility is identified, which
then proves the theorem.
The preference profiles we construct consist of only the following three preferences
P¯i : A1 A3 A2 A4 · · · AK · · ·
Pi : A1 A2 A3 A4 · · · AK · · ·
Pˆi : A2 A1 A3 A4 · · · AK · · ·
Specifically, the critical bundles are top-ranked and the ranking of A4 through AK is the
same across the three preferences.
Claim 1: Let the first preference profile be such that all the agents have the same preference
as Pi in above table, i.e., P 1 = (P1, P2, P3, · · · , Pn). Then ϕ(P 1) is as below.
A1 A2 A3 A4 · · · AK · · ·
1 · · ·n : d1
n
d2
n
d3
n
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
By sd-envy-freeness, agents have the same lottery. In order to verify the claim, we notice
that these exists x ∈ A1 such that qx = d1. Then feasibility of x together with sd-envy-freeness
require LiA1 6 d1n . Similarly, there exists x ∈ A1 ∩ A2 such that qx = d1 + d2, which then
implies LiA1 + LiA2 6 d1n +
d2
n
. This argument proceeds until
∑K
k=1 LiAk 6 1. It is hence
evident that any sd-envy-free and feasible assignment L 6= ϕ(P 1) is dominated by ϕ(P 1).
Claim 2: Let P 2 = (P¯1, P2, P3, · · · , Pn). Then ϕ(P 2) is as follows.
A1 A2 A3 A4 · · · AK · · ·
1 : d1
n
0 d2+d3
n
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
2 · · ·n : d1
n
d2
n−1
d3− d2+d3n
n−1
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
From P 1 to P 2, agent 1 is the unilateral deviator and she reversed the ranking of A2 and
A3 with no other change. Hence sd-strategy-proofness implies ϕ1A(P 2) = ϕ1A(P 1) for all
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A 6= A2, A3. Then sd-envy-freeness implies ϕiA(P 2) = ϕ1A(P 2) for all i = 2, · · · , n and all
A 6= A2, A3. Notice that sd-efficiency implies ϕ1A2(P 2) = 0 since otherwise, ϕiA3(P 2) = 0
for all i = 2, · · · , n, which implies ϕ1A3(P 2) = d3 and hence ϕ1A2(P 2) + ϕ1A3(P 2) > d3 > 1:
contradiction to feasibility. Given ϕ1A2(P
2) = 0, ϕ1A3(P
2) = d2+d3
n
is implied by feasibility
and then remaining elements are implied by sd-envy-freeness and feasibility.
Claim 3: Let P 3 = (P1, Pˆ2, P3, · · · , Pn). Then ϕ(P 3) is as follows.
A1 A2 A3 A4 · · · AK · · ·
1 : d1
n−1
d2− d1+d2n
n−1
d3
n
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
2 : 0 d1+d2
n
d3
n
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
3 · · ·n : d1
n−1
d2− d1+d2n
n−1
d3
n
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
From P 1 to P 3, agent 2 is the unilateral deviator and she reversed the ranking of A1 and
A2 with no other change. Hence sd-strategy-proofness implies ϕ2A(P 3) = ϕ2A(P 1) for all
A 6= A1, A2. Then sd-envy-freeness implies ϕiA(P 3) = ϕ2A(P 3) for all i = 1, 3, · · · , n and all
A 6= A1, A2. In addition, sd-efficiency implies ϕ2A1(P 3) = 0, given which all other elements
are implied by sd-envy-freeness and feasibility.
Claim 4: Let P 4 = (P¯1, Pˆ2, P3, · · · , Pn). Then ϕ(P 4) is as follows.
A1 A2 A3 A4 · · · AK · · ·
1 : d1
n−1 0
d1+d2+d3
n
− d1
n−1
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
2 : 0 d1+d2+d3
n
− d3−
d2+d3
n
n−1
d3− d2+d3n
n−1
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
3 · · ·n : d1
n−1
d1+d2+d3
n
− d1
n−1 −
d3− d2+d3n
n−1
d3− d2+d3n
n−1
d4
n
· · · dK
n
0
First, from P 3 to P 4, agent 1 is the unilateral deviator and she reversed the ranking of A2
and A3. Hence ϕ1A(P 4) = ϕ1A(P 3) for all A 6= A2, A3. Second, from P 2 to P 4, agent 2 is the
unilateral deviator and she reversed the ranking of A1 and A2. Hence ϕ2A(P 4) = ϕ2A(P 2) for
all A 6= A1, A2. Third, sd-envy-freeness implies that ϕiA(P 4) = ϕ1A(P 4) for all i = 3, · · · , n
and A 6= A2, A3. In addition sd-envy-freeness implies also that ϕiA3(P 4) = ϕ2A3(P 4) for all
i = 3, · · · , n. Fourth, sd-efficiency implies ϕ1A2(P 4) = ϕ2A1(P 4) = 0. Last, the remaining
elements, i.e., ϕ1A3(P
4) and ϕiA2(P
4) for i = 2, · · · , n, are implied by feasibility.
By the fact that there exists x ∈ A1 ∩ A2 such that x 6∈ Ak for all k = 3, · · · , K and that
qx = d1 + d2, we have the following contradiction.
d1 + d2 =
∑
i∈I
ϕiA1(P
4) + ϕiA2(P
4)⇒ d1 = 0.

Remark 3. For the cases where K = 2 or 3, the answer is unclear and deserves further inves-
tigation. Let for example K = 2. In other words, all the objects have the same capacity. Let
it be q¯. Then whether or not there is a desirable rule on the universal domain depends on the
parameters of the problem: m, q¯, and n. When n 6 3 or m 6 2, the random serial dictatorship
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rule is sd-efficient and hence possibility holds. The arguments used to prove sd-efficiency of the
RSD rule of objects with no more than 3 agents applies to show the result here. However, when
n > 4 and m > 3, the conclusion depends on the relative size of q¯ and n. Consider two extreme
cases for example. If q¯ = 1, then impossibility holds. For this case, the idea used in the random
assignment of objects can be applied to prove the impossibility. If q¯ = n− 1, the random serial
dictatorship rule is sd-efficient. To see this, notice that the feasibility dictates that the serial
dictatorship with an arbitrary ordering of agents will allocate to n− 2 agents the whole bundle
and the remaining two agents share the other whole bundle. Then the problem degenerates to
showing sd-efficiency with less than 3 agents, where the arguments for the object assignments
apply. 
5 Decomposable Random Assignments
We address in this section the decomposability issue, i.e., the problem of expressing a ran-
dom assignment as a convex combination of deterministic assignments. We present a necessary
condition, which is used to show that the PSB rule is in general not decomposable. In Ap-
pendix B, we transform the decomposability problem to n maximum flow problems, so that our
knowledge on finding the maximum flow can be used to find the decompositions, if any.
For the random assignment of objects, a random assignment is a bi-stochastic matrix, i.e.,
a square matrix such that every element is in [0, 1], every row sums to one and every column
sums to one. The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem states that every bi-stochastic matrix can be
decomposed as a lottery over permutation matrices, which coincide with the set of deterministic
assignments in that model. Hence decomposability is ensured in the classical framework. Un-
fortunately this is not true for the random assignment of bundles, and it is well-known that not
every random assignment is decomposable. A random assignment studied here is also known
in the literature as a plane-stochastic matrix. The issue of the decomposability has been studied
by for example Brualdi and Csima (1975b), Brualdi and Csima (1975a), Csima (1970), Jurkat
and Ryser (1968), Marchi and Tarazaga (1979).
Before presenting our study, we briefly discuss the papers studying the decomposability is-
sue. Budish et al. (2013) studied two dimensional real matrices of size |I|×|O|, where I denotes
the agent set and O the object set, with the constraints in the form of q
S
6
∑
s∈S
Ls 6 qS , where
S ⊂ I ×O is a subset of indexes and q
S
, qS are two real numbers. These subsets of indexes are
collected and called a constraint structure, denoted as S. The authors then introduce a condition
on S called “bihierarchy”, which requires that S can be partitioned into two subsets S1,S2 so
that, for an arbitrary pair S, S ′ from either S1 or S2, either they are disjoint (S ∩ S ′ = ∅) or one
contains the other (S ⊂ S ′ or S ′ ⊂ S). They show that whenever the constraint structure is a
bihierarchy, the random assignment is decomposable. Loosely speaking, bihierarchy requires
that S can be partitioned into one set of “row constraints” and one set of “column constraints.”
A row(column) constraint refers to a subset of rows(columns) or a subset of a row(column). It
is evident that the set of matrices attaining the bihierarchy structure includes the bi-stochastic
matrices as a proper subset. It is also easy to see that a random assignment of bundles L ∈ L in
our model may not attain the bihierarchy structure since two bundles might overlap with each
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other.
Given the impossibility of decomposability for general random assignments, some recent
papers including Akbarpour and Nikzad (2017) and Nguyen et al. (2016) study extent to which
a non-decomposable random assignment can be approximated by a decomposable one. Akbar-
pour and Nikzad (2017) push the result of Budish et al. (2013) further by showing that if the
constraint structure S can be partitioned into two parts P and Q such that P is a bihierarchy
and the elements in Q satisfy a condition defined with respect to P , then there is a lottery over
deterministic assignments such that the constraints in P are met exactly and the constraints inQ
are met arbitrarily closely. This result is useful when some constraints are treated as “soft”. For
example, the constraint that a school has at least 50% of its students live within walking distance
can be treated as soft, since if necessary 48% will also be satisfactory. Nguyen et al. (2016) im-
pose a restriction on the random assignment that no agent gets a bundle containing more than
k objects and show that it can be expressed as a lottery over deterministic assignments, which
over-allocates each object by at most k − 1 units.
We first provide a necessary condition for a random assignment to be decomposable. Given
an arbitrary agent i ∈ I and an arbitrary bundle A ∈ X , we denote DiA as the collection of
deterministic assignments, each of which assigns A to agent i, i.e., DiA ≡ {D ∈ D : DiA = 1}.
The following is the necessary condition.
Lemma 2. Let L ∈ L be decomposable. For all i ∈ I and A ∈ X ,
LiA 6
∑
D∈DiA
min{LjB : DjB = 1}. (2)
Proof. Let L =
∑
D∈D
β(D) ·D. Fix i ∈ I and A ∈ X , then LiA =
∑
D∈DiA
β(D). Hence it suffices
to show β(D) 6 min{LjB : DjB = 1} for all D ∈ DiA. Suppose not, let β(D) > LjB for some
j 6= i or B 6= A and D ∈ DiA such that DjB = 1. Then we have a contradiction:
β(D) > LjB =
∑
D′∈DjB
β(D′) > β(D)
where the last inequality comes from D ∈ DiA ∩ DjB. 
The following example uses the necessary condition to show that the PSB rule is in general
not decomposable.
Example 15. Let X = {a, b, c}, qx = 1 ∀x ∈ X , and I = {1, 2, 3}. Let the preference profile
P and the random assignment L = PSB(P ) be as below.
P1 : ab c b ∅ · · ·
P2 : c b a ∅ · · ·
P3 : c a b ∅ · · ·
ab a b c ∅
L1 : 3/4 0 0 0 1/4
L2 : 0 0 1/4 1/2 1/4
L3 : 0 1/4 0 1/2 1/4
Utilizing Lemma 2, we can easily see that L is not decomposable. Let D1 be such that
D11ab = D
1
2c = D
1
3∅ = 1. Let D
2 be such that D21ab = D
2
2∅ = D
2
3c = 1. Then D1ab = {D1, D2}
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since if bundle ab is given to agent 1, either agent 2 or 3 gets c and the other gets nothing. The
following simple calculation tells that L is not decomposable.
L1ab = 3/4 >
∑
D∈D1ab
min {LjB : DjB = 1}
= min{L1ab, L2c, L3∅}+ min{L1ab, L2∅, L3c} = 1/4 + 1/4.

In Appendix B, we transform a decomposition problem into a series of maximum flow
problems. Since the maximum flow problem has long been studied by mathematicians and
computer scientists, such a transformation is expected to be useful in the sense that already
known results on maximum flows can be applied to check decomposability. In particular, when
we need to judge whether or not a given random assignment is decomposable, one generated
by the PSB rule for instance, some program packages can be used immediately. For example,
MatLab provides built-in functions to calculate maximum flows.
6 Conclusion
We study random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The induced feasibility re-
quirement has been shown to have significant implications for the design of random assignment
rules. First, the characterization of sd-efficiency is fundamentally different in this setup. Sec-
ond, the possibility result of Liu (2017) fails under this new feasibility requirement. However,
we identify a preference domain on which a desirable existence result exists.
The following questions remain unresolved and are presumably of interest. First, given an
arbitrary preference profile, what is an algorithm that identifies all sd-efficient assignments?
Second, on the essentially monotonic domain, is there a desirable, in particular a non-constant
rule, that is different from the RSDB rule (equivalently PSB rule)?
Appendix
Appendix A presents the the proof of Theorem 1 and the definition of the simultaneous
eating algorithm for bundles. Thereafter, Appendix B transforms the decomposability problem
into a series of maximum flow problems.
A Efficiency
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity: We show the contrapositive statement. Let L ∈ L be balanced at P ∈ Pn. Then
there is an α : T → R+ such that (i) α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A, (ii) ∀x ∈ X :∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B} α(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A} α(i, A,B). We show L is not sd-efficient at P .
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To do this, we construct another matrix L′. Let  ∈ R++ be a very small positive number and
let for ∀j ∈ I and ∀C ∈ X ,
L′jC = LjC +
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,B=C}
 · α(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,A=C}
 · α(i, A,B).
Notice first that by letting  to be sufficiently small, L′jC > 0 for all j ∈ I and C ∈ X . Then
the following two classes of equations show that L′ is a feasible random assignment, in other
words L′ ∈ L.
∀j ∈ I : ∑
C∈X
L′jC =
∑
C∈X
LjC +
∑
C∈X
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,B=C}
 · α(i, A,B)
− ∑
C∈X
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,A=C}
 · α(i, A,B)
= 1 +
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T (P,L):i=j}
 · [α(i, A,B)− α(i, A,B)] = 1
∀x ∈ X : ∑
i∈I,x∈C
L′jC =
∑
i∈I,x∈C
LjC +
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B}
 · α(i, A,B)
− ∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A}
 · α(i, A,B)
=
∑
i∈I,x∈C
LjC = qx.
The last equality follows from the definition of α. Next, it is evident that L′j P
sd
j Lj for all
j ∈ I since the probability transfers are all from less preferred bundles to more preferred ones.
Consequently, L is dominated by L′ constructed above and hence not sd-efficient at P .
Sufficiency: We show the contrapositive statement. Let L be sd-inefficient at P . Then there
is another random assignment L′ ∈ L such that L′ 6= L and L′j P sdj Lj for all j. We construct
an α : T (P,L) → R+ such that (i) α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A, (ii) ∀x ∈ X :∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B} α(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A} α(i, A,B).
By the fact that Lj, L′j ∈ ∆(X ) for all j ∈ I , there is a system of probability transfers
β : T → R+ such that, ∀j ∈ I and C ∈ X ,
L′jC = LjC +
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,B=C}
β(i, A,B)−
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :i=j,A=C}
β(i, A,B). (3)
In other words, L′ is constructed from L by β. In addition, since both L and L′ are feasible
random assignments, ∀x ∈ X ,∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B}
β(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A}
β(i, A,B). (4)
Notice that the vector β in general can not serve as the α we want since β may transfer some
positive probability from (i, A) to (i, B) where LiA = 0 and(or) A Pi B, which is not allowed
by the definition of α. In the following, we construct a wanted α from β in two steps.
Step 1: Given β : T → R+ satisfying (3) and (4), we construct a γ : T → R+ satisfying
not only (3) and (4) but also that γ(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0.
To do so, pick an arbitrary (i, A,B) ∈ T such that β(i, A,B) > 0 and LiA = 0. We claim
that there is another bundle C 6= A such that β(i, C,A) > 0, since otherwise, according to (3),
we have a contradiction: L′iA 6 0 + 0− β(i, A,B) < 0.
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Let β(i, A,B) = u and β(i, C,A) = v. Then we update β to β′ by the following three
changes without anything else.
If u 6 v, let β′(i, A,B) = 0, β′(i, C,B) = β(i, C,B) + u, β′(i, C,A) = v − u;
If u > v, let β′(i, A,B) = u− v, β′(i, C,B) = β(i, C,B) + v, β′(i, C,A) = 0.
Notice first that no matter whether u 6 v or not, β′ still satisfies (3) and (4). Notice in
addition that for the case where u 6 v, β′(i, A,B) = 0 and hence the unwanted instance where
β(i, A,B) > 0 and LiA = 0 is eliminated. While for the other case where u > v, this unwanted
instance is still there. Then we can repeat the update above by finding some other bundleD 6= A
such that β′(i,D,A) > 0. By repeatedly applying the above update, we can finally construct
a vector γ : T → R+ which satisfies not only (3) and (4) but also that γ(i, A,B) > 0 implies
LiA > 0.
Step 2: Given γ : T → R+ generated by the last step, we construct the wanted α : T → R+
satisfying not only (3) and (4) but also that α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A. In
other words, positive probability transfers are allowed only from less preferred bundles to more
preferred bundles.
To do so, pick an arbitrary (i, A,B) ∈ T such that γ(i, A,B) > 0 and A Pi B. We claim
that there is a sequence (i, Al, Bl)Ll=1 ⊂ T such that (i) γ(i, Al, Bl) > 0 and Bl Pi Al for
all l = 1, · · · , L, (ii) B1 Ri B Ri A1, (iii) Bl Ri Al+1 for all l = 1, · · · , L − 1, and (iv)
BL Ri A Ri A
L. The following figure depicts an instance where L = 2.
Pi:
better worse
B2 A B1 A2 B A1
We show the existence of such a sequence by construction. First, notice that there exists
(i, A1, B1) ∈ T such that γ(i, A1, B1) > 0, B1 Pi A1, and B1 Ri B Ri A1. Because otherwise,∑
CPiB
L′iC <
∑
CPiB
LiC which is contradicting L′i P
sd
i Li. Fixing A
1 and B1, if B1 Ri A,
we are done by letting L = 1. If not, there exists another triple (i, A2, B2) ∈ T such that
γ(i, A2, B2) > 0, B2 Pi A2, and B1 Ri A2. Because otherwise,
∑
CPiB1
L′iC <
∑
CPiB1
LiC
which is contradicting L′i P
sd
i Li. We repeat this procedure to identify the sequence and finally
the finiteness of bundles gives BL Ri A Ri AL.
Fixing such a sequence, let µ = min{γ(i, A,B), γ(i, Al, Bl) : l = 1, · · · , L}. Then we
update γ to γ′ by the following changes without anything else.
γ′(i, A,B) = γ(i, A,B)− µ
γ′(i, Al, Bl) = γ(i, Al, Bl)− µ, ∀l = 1, · · · , L
γ′(i, A,BL) = γ(i, A,BL) + µ
γ′(i, A1, B) = γ(i, A1, B) + µ
γ′(i, Al+1, Bl) = γ(i, Al+1, Bl) + µ, ∀l = 1, · · · , L− 1
The following figure depicts the update, where blue solid arrows corresponds to the minuses
and the red dotted arrows to the pluses.
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Pi:
better worse
B2 A B1 A2 B A1
It is evident that γ : T (L) → R+ satisfies not only (3) and (4) but also that γ′(i, A,B) > 0
implies LiA > 0. It satisfies (3) evidently. To see that it satisfies (4), notice that for all C ∈ X ,∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :A=C} γ
′(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :A=C} γ(i, A,B) and
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :B=C} γ
′(i, A,B) =∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :B=C} γ(i, A,B).
By repeatedly applying the above update, we can finally construct an α : T → R+ satisfying
not only (3) and (4) but also that α(i, A,B) > 0 implies LiA > 0 and B Pi A.
To show the sufficiency, it remains to show that such an α satisfies∀x ∈ X :∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈B}
α(i, A,B) =
∑
{(i,A,B)∈T :x∈A}
α(i, A,B),
which is evident by the fact that α satisfies (4).
A.2 Simultaneous Eating Algorithm with Varying Speeds
This section is devoted to the relation between sd-efficiency and the simultaneous eating
algorithm with varying eating speeds, which are variants of the PSB rule by allowing non-
uniform eating speeds. Let wi : [0, 1] → R+ with
∫ 1
0
wi(t)dt = 1 denote the eating speed
for agent i, where wi(t) denote the eating speed of agent i at time t. The restriction that the
integral of wi(t) on the interval [0, 1] equals one comes from the fact that the summation of the
shares eaten by an agent should sum to one. PSB is a special case of the simultaneous eating
with wi(t) = 1 for all i ∈ I and t ∈ [0, 1]. Given a speed profile w = (wi)i∈I , we define the
simultaneous eating algorithm for bundles below.
Definition 14. Given a preference profile P ∈ Pn, the simultaneous eating algorithm for
bundles with speed profile w (SEBw) gives a random assignment SEBw(P ) ≡ Lv¯ below.
Let t0 = 0, X 0 = X , r0x = qx and r0x¯ = n− qx for all x ∈ X . Let in addition L0 be a matrix
of size n× |X | with all zeros.
For v = 1, · · · , v¯
Ivx ≡ {i ∈ I : x ∈ τ(Pi,X v−1)},∀x ∈ X;
tv ≡ tv−1 + min

{
δ ∈ R+ :
∑
i∈Ivx
∫ tv−1+δ
tv−1 wi(t)dt = r
v−1
x , r
v−1
x > 0
}
⋃{
δ ∈ R+ :
∑
i∈I\Ivx
∫ tv−1+δ
tv−1 wi(t)dt = r
v−1
x¯ , r
v−1
x¯ > 0
}
 ;
LviA ≡ Lv−1iA +
{∫ tv
tv−1 wi(t)dt, if A = τ(Pi,X v−1)
0, otherwise
,∀i ∈ I, A ∈ X ;
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rvx ≡ rv−1x −
∑
i∈Ivx
∫ tv
tv−1
wi(t)dt,∀x ∈ X;
rvx¯ ≡ rv−1x¯ −
∑
i∈I\Ivx
∫ tv
tv−1
wi(t)dt,∀x ∈ X;
X v ≡ X v−1\{A ∈ X v−1 : ∃x ∈ X s.t. [x ∈ A, rvx = 0] or [x 6∈ A, rvx¯ = 0]};
where v¯ is identified by the step when X v¯ = ∅.
Proposition 5. The random assignment L = SEBw(P ) is sd-efficient at P for all w.
The above proposition can be proved by the same argument that proves sd-efficiency for the
PSB rule.
Remark 4. The converse of Proposition 5 is not true. In other words, there is an sd-efficient L
at a given preference profile P that can not be generated by the simultaneous eating algorithm
with any eating speed. Let X = {a, b, c} and qx = 1 for all x ∈ X . Let the preference profile
P and the assignment L be as below.
P1 : ab c · · ·
P2 : c b · · ·
P3 : c a · · ·
a b c ab
L1 : 0 0 1 0
L2 : 0 1 0 0
L3 : 1 0 0 0
The random assignment L has been verified to be sd-efficient at P by the Step 1.2 in the
proof of Proposition 1. We now show that there is no speed profile w such that L = SEBw(P ).
Suppose not, let for each x ∈ X , t(x) be the point in time when object x is eaten up. Then
L1ab = 0 implies that at the earliest time when agent 1 has a positive eating speed, i.e., min{t ∈
(0, 1] : w1(t) > 0}, either a or b has already been eaten up, i.e., min{t ∈ (0, 1] : w1(t) >
0} > min{t(a), t(b)}. Notice that L1c > 0, hence t(c) > min{t ∈ [0, 1] : w1(t) > 0} >
min{t(a), t(b)}. If min{t(a), t(b)} = t(b), then t(c) > t(b) implies L2b = 0: contradiction.
Otherwise, t(c) > t(a) implies L3a = 0: contradiction. 
B Decomposability and Maximum Flow Problems
Let L ∈ L be an arbitrarily given random assignment and let β ∈ ∆(D) be an arbitrary
lottery over deterministic assignments. We show in the following that judging whether β is
a decomposition of L is equivalent to checking n maximum flow problems, one for each i ∈
I . The primitive of such a problem is a single-source multiple-sink flow network, denoted as
Ni(L, β) ≡ (V,E, c).
• The set of vertices V is the union of three sets: V = I ∪ (I ×X ) ∪ D.
• The set of edges E = {(i, jA) : i = j and A ∈ X} ∪ {(iA,D) : A ∈ X and DiA =
1} ∪ {(D, jB) : j 6= i, B ∈ X , and DjB = 1} ∪ {(jB, j) : j 6= i and B ∈ X}. Hence a
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typical flow starts from i to a vertex iA, then to a vertex D such that DiA = 1, then to a
jB such that DjB = 1, and finally to j. In other words, the unique source is i and the set
of sinks is I\{i}.
• The capacity function c : (I ×X ) ∪ D → R+ specifies for each vertex other than the
source and the sinks a capacity of flow. In particular, c(iA) = LiA for all iA ∈ I × X
and c(D) = β(D) for all D ∈ D. So the parameters of this maximum problem, β and L,
specify the capacities of vertices.
Below is an example of such a network.
Example 16. Consider the random assignment L in Example 3. Figure 8 depicts N1(L, β) for
an arbitrarily specified β. 
1
2
3
1ab
1/6
1a
1/6
1b
1/2
1∅
1/6
2ab
1/6
2a
0
2b
1/3
2∅
1/2
3ab
1/2
3a
0
3b
1/3
3∅
1/6
D1 : 1− ab, 2− b, 3− ∅
β(D1)
D2 : 1− ab, 2− ∅, 3− b
β(D2)
D3 : 1− b, 2− ab, 3− ∅
β(D3)
D4 : 1− ∅, 2− ab, 3− b
β(D4)
D5 : 1− b, 2− ∅, 3− ab
β(D5)
D6 : 1− ∅, 2− b, 3− ab
β(D6)
D7 : 1− a, 2− b, 3− b
β(D7)
D8 : 1− b, 2− a, 3− b
β(D8)
D9 : 1− b, 2− b, 3− a
β(D9)
Figure 8: A Maximum Flow Problem
It is evident that the lottery for agent i induced by β equals Li if and only if the maximum
flow on the network Ni(L, β) is one. This observation gives the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. A lottery β ∈ D is a decomposition of L ∈ L if and only if the maximum flow on
Ni(L, β) is 1 for all i ∈ I .
The following is an application of the above lemma.
Example 16 (continued). Let β ∈ ∆(D) denote an arbitrary lottery on deterministic assign-
ments. From the network in Example 16, it is seen that maxflowNi(L, β) = 1 is equivalent to
the equation system i as below for each i = 1, 2, 3.
system 1:
β(D1) + β(D2) = 1/6
β(D7) = 1/6
β(D3) + β(D5) + β(D8) + β(D9) = 1/2
β(D4) + β(D6) = 1/6
system 2:
β(D3) + β(D4) = 1/6
β(D8) = 0
β(D1) + β(D6) + β(D7) + β(D9) = 1/3
β(D2) + β(D5) = 1/2
system 3:
β(D5) + β(D6) = 1/2
β(D9) = 0
β(D2) + β(D4) + β(D7) + β(D8) = 1/3
β(D1) + β(D3) = 1/6
By solving the above equation system, we get the unique decomposition of the random as-
signment: β(D1) = 1/6, β(D4) = 1/6, β(D5) = 1/2, β(D7) = 1/6, and β(D2) = β(D3) =
β(D6) = β(D8) = β(D9) = 0. 
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